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The Uniform Commercial Code and the
Concept of Possession in the Marketing
and Financing of Goods
John F. Dolan*
The "buyer in ordinarycourse" rule of section 9-307(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code shelters goodfaith purchasers of certain goodsfrom the rival claims of sellers' secured creditors. Professor Dolan argues that the Code's refusal to let title determine
disputes over goods in other contexts extends to clashes between
creditors and buyers under section 9-307(1). Hefinds the key to
the Code's schemefor settling these clashesin the "specialproperty
interest" a buyer acquires at the moment goods are identied to a
contract ofsale. The scheme, he believes, is one ofgeneralrespect
for reasonableexpectations based on possession, the specialproperty interest taking up where those expectations cease. Professor
Dolan expounds his interpretationof the Code in reference to a rival
interpretationrecently adoptedby the New York Court ofAppeals
in Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.
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"Then the bird does not belong to any of you?" Spade asked, "but to a
General Kemidov?"
"Belong?" the fat man said jovially, "Well, sir, you might say it
belonged to the King of Spain, but I don't see how you can honestly
grant anybody else clear title to it-except by right of possession." He
clucked. "An article of that value that has passed from hand to hand
by such means is clearly the property of whoever can get hold of it."'
I.

Introduction

The function of property law is the substitution of rational rules
for force in the allocation of property. Title and seisin2 figured boldly
in the first conceptual scheme to which the common law committed
that function.' Both notions drew their importance from the principle
1. D. HAMMETT, THE MALTESE FALCON, in THE NovELs OF DASHIELL HAMMETT 397
(1965).
2. For a discussion of the concept of seisin as applied to personal property, see Maitland,
The Seisin of Chattels, 1 LAW Q. REv.324 (1885).
3. The term "possession" itself takes on broad metaphysical significance in common law,
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of "security of property": a grantee acquires whatever his grantor possesses, and no more--caveat emptor. So enshrined did security of
property, title, and seisin become that courts elaborated rules to serve
them without regard for the commercial realities that shaped reasonable but contrary expectations. It took a centuries-long struggle to
temper the harsh results of the entrenched notions. Resolution came

in the form of an exception to security of property principles, the good
faith purchase doctrine, under which a purchaser for value who takes
in good faith and without notice of a prior claim defeats the prior
claimant. Possession,4 the touchstone of seisin, thus appeared in a new
light, since deference to expectations based on possession was also the

core of the good faith purchase exception.
The common law and, more recently, the Uniform Commercial
Code5 (the Code) continue to refine the synthesis based on security of
property6 with exceptions for good faith purchase.7 The Code takes a

considerable step toward dismantling the original metaphysical framework of untempered security of property principles by cutting back the
role of title in rules governing the rights of buyers and sellers. The
Code recognizes from the moment at which goods are "identified to" a

contract of sale a buyer's "special property interest,"' which may antedate passage of title and the seller's delivery of the goods. The scope
and nature of the special property interest pose a difficulty, however,
because apart from a definitional section the Code refers to this interest
elliptically. Encountering that difficulty, courts have sometimes succumbed to the allure of familiar title rules that are not explicitly abrofor example, in the law of trespass and larceny. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 206-46
(1881); 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 121 (S.E. Thome ed. 1968).
4. In law, the term "possession" carries a measure of historic freight. Defining "legal possession" has consumed a good deal of legal talent and energy. See Bingham, The Nature and
ImportanceofLegalPossession(pts. 1-2), 13 MICH. L. Rlv.535, 623 (1915). This Article uses the
term "possession," not in the sense of "legal possession," but in the everyday sense elaborated by
"the fat man" in the epigraph of this Article. Cf.U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(c) (defining "receipt" of
goods as "taking physical possession of them").
5. All section and comment citations, unless otherwise noted, are to the 1972 version of the
Code. Although New York has adopted the 1972 Amendments to Article 9, the 1962 version of
the Code governed the Tanbro case, discussed in text accompanying notes 12-13 infra. With one
exception the 1972 amendments do not bear on this discussion. See text accompanying note 226
infra.
6. See U.C.C. §§ 2-401(1), 3-201(1), 7-504(1), 8-301(1), 9-201.
7. Good faith purchase doctrine in its generic sense includes a wide range of rules that allow
a purchaser to take more than his grantor had. These rules countervail security of property
dogma which holds that the grantee can take no greater property interest than the grantor has.
See generally Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954); Warren, Cutting Off Claimsof Ownersho Underthe Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI.
L. REv.469 (1963).
8. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
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gated by the Code. This Article argues that nothing should turn on
title; that we can easily identify the Code provisions that delineate the
special property interest; and that these provisions settle claims to disputed goods in a manner consistent with reasonable expectations based
on possession, to which the Code routinely defers unless a more compelling public policy calls for a different outcome.
The focus of the discussion will be the New York Court of Appeals' recent expansive reading of section 9-307(1) of the Code. That
section states one of several Code rules derived from the good faith
purchase doctrine: "A buyer in ordinary course of business. . . takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence."
The New York court properly attended to commercial practice in the
industry in question and correctly held that one may benefit from the
Code's buyer in ordinary course rules even though he does not take
possession of goods. But the court incurred the dudgeon of at least
some commercial lawyers9 by holding that it is "ordinary" for a purchaser to obtain superior rights in goods that are in the possession not
of the seller but of the seller's creditor. To the extent that the rule
springs from pro-buyer sentiment, it misses the mark. Buyers will generally suffer from the higher cost of credit to which the rule promises to
lead by fostering secret sales. To the extent that the rule reflects title
considerations, it resurrects a brand of thinking legislatures and commercial lawyers rejected long ago.1" If the rule withstands sciutiny,
possession will assuredly become something less than the nine points of
the law commercial parties think it to be. Most importantly, by denying the controlling significance of reasonable expectations based on
possession and creating instead a broad new exception to security of
property principles, the New York rule upsets the scheme of the Code.
Part II sets forth the facts of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. DeeringMAilli9. See, e.g., Kreindler, The Uniform Commercial Code andPriorityRights Between the Seller
in Possession and a Good Faith Third-PartyPurchaser,82 CoM. L.J. 86 (1977); Kripke, Should
Section 9-307(1) ofthe Unform CommercialCode ApplyAgainst a SecuredPartyin Possession?, 33
Bus. LAW. 153 (1977); UNIFORM COM. CODE L. LETTER, November 1976, at 1. Not all reaction
was negative, however. See Birnbaum, Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus
Possessory Security Interests: A Reply to Professor Kroke, 33 Bus. LAW. 2607 (1978); Gottlieb,
Section 9-307(1) and Tanbro Fabrics: A FurtherResponse, 33 Bus. LAW. 2611 (1978); Burke, Secured Transactions,1977 Un/form Commercial Code Annual Survey, 32 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1149-50
(1977); Coogan, Article 9-An Agendafor the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012 (1978). Professor
Coogan challenges many of the assumptions underlying the possession rules discussed in this Article, but largely in a different context, viz, bankruptcy and "paperless" instruments. To some
extent, however, his article and this one reflect different views on the efficacy of possession as a
touchstone in secured transactions.
10. See U.C.C. § 2-401, Comment I; id. § 1-201(37).
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ken, Inc.," which occasioned the New York court's pronouncement,
and then proposes an alternative resolution of the claims in Tanbro
that would properly acknowledge the role of special property interests
under the Code. To support the alternative and show the manner in
which the New York rule damages the Code's possession-oriented
scheme, Parts III, IV, and V discuss a range of financing devices and
standard credit transactions in which possession-based expectations
have a governing role. With the Code's scheme fully developed, Part
VI discounts the affirmative arguments of the Tanbro opinion for the
New York rule.
II.

The New York Rule

A.

The Tanbro Facts

In 1968, Deering Milliken Company (Deering) manufactured
510,000 yards of fabric for Mill Fabrics (Mill), which "converted" the
unfinished textile into dyed and patterned goods.' 2 In a fashion common among industries in which suppliers like Deering are strong and
buyers like Mill are weak, textile converters customarily purchase unprocessed material without knowing what their sales will be, and before
they are able to pay for the unprocessed materials. In the event a converter cannot generate sufficient sales volume to use all the fabric it has
ordered, the converter customarily resells the fabric to a second converter. Thus, it is ordinary in the industry for converters to be both
primary buyers (from the manufacturer) and sub-buyers (from converters reselling excess, unprocessed goods).
For three reasons Deering customarily retained possession of the
fabric until a converter had an order to fill. First, the parties knew that
some of the goods might be resold to another converter; they wanted to
avoid double shipping and handling costs. Second, converter warehouse space was limited. Third, having retained under the contract of
sale a security interest in the fabric, Deering wanted to perfect that security interest by possession, the "bill and hold" practice common to
Deering's marketing program. Significantly, the clause creating Deering's security interest provided that the interest secured not only the
price of the fabric purchased but all other amounts due Deering from
11. 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976).
12. This statement of the Tanbro facts draws on four opinions by the New York Courts.
Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 469, 318 N.Y.S.2d 764, aff'd
mem., 29 N.Y.2d 690, 274 N.E.2d 751, 325 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1971); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 48 App. Div. 2d 784, 369 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d
590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976).
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Mill as well. Although Mill paid Deering for this fabric it was in debt
to Deering already and incurred further obligations throughout the
13
course of the transaction.
After contracting to buy the fabric, Mill took delivery of some
250,000 yards. Sometime between the 1968 purchase and the spring of
1969, Deering ended further production of the fabric. When it received an inquiry from Tanbro Fabrics Corporation (Tanbro), it referred Tanbro to Mill. Thus, unwittingly, Deering salespeople invited
Tanbro to make the very purchase that triggered the dispute.
In May 1969 Mill, acting through a broker, entered into a contract
of sale with Tanbro for the 260,000 yards of fabric Deering still held.
Tanbro, itself a frequent customer of Deering, was familiar with Deering's bill and hold practices, and knew Deering held these goods for
Mill; nonetheless, Tanbro paid Mill for them. In October and November of the same year Tanbro wanted to take delivery of 57,000 yards of
the fabric. Contrary to its custom in such secondary purchase situations, Tanbro did not contact Deering but asked Mill to arrange a drop
shipment to a converting facility operated by a Tanbro affiliate. Only
in January 1970, after Mill's financial demise became apparent, did
Tanbro contact Deering to demand delivery of the 203,000 yards of
fabric still at Deering's plant. From May 1969 until January 1970
Deering held goods it thought belonged to Mill, while in fact Mill had
agreed to sell them to Tanbro. When Tanbro demanded delivery of
the 203,000 yards, Deering, aware of Mill's insolvency, claimed the
goods. Tanbro sued for conversion, and won both at trial and on appeal.
B.

Interestsof the Buyer andthe Secured ParT

The rights of Deering and Tanbro to the fabric turn on a number
of Code concepts that balance the interests of secured parties on the
one hand and buyers on the other. Deering perfected by possession 14 a
security interest Mill created under the purchase agreement. But Tan13. In the first set of reported opinions, the appellate division and court of appeals suggest
that Mill paid for the fabric, that Mill then resold to Tanbro, and that only then did Deering make
credit advances to Mill. 35 App. Div. 2d 469, 470, 318 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766, 767, aff'd mem., 29
N.Y.2d 690, 274 N.E.2d 751, 325 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1971). That chronology would dictate a result in
favor of Tanbro without resort to U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See U.C.C. § 9-203(2); note 22 infra. The
opinions dealt with a pretrial motion to compel arbitration. The motion ultimately failed. In the
later set of opinions, both the appellate division and the court of appeals refer to evidence, varying
the pleaded facts, to the effect that throughout the course of the dealings Mill was indebted to
Deering. 48 App. Div. 2d at 786, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 148; 39 N.Y.2d at 635, 350 N.E.2d at 591, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 261.
14. U.C.C. § 9-305 permits perfection in this manner.
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bro as a purchaser enjoyed rights in the goods, notwithstanding Deering's perfected security interest. Section 2-501(1) provides that a
purchaser acquires an interest when goods are identified to the contract
as this fabric was. 5 Nothing in the Code prevents a debtor in Mill's
position from selling his interest to a third party like Tanbro 1 6 The
drafters did not give a name to the interest the debtor may se. 7 They
did, however, provide a label for the interest the buyer obtains; it is a
"special property . . . interest." 8 It is not a security interest.19 Its
incidents under other sections of Articles 2 and 9 determine the buyer's
rights against the seller's creditors under the rules of good faith
purchase? ° Various Code provisions declare that title is of no consequence," and both the Code and common law give the good faith purchaser no other interest in the goods.2 2

15. "In the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs . . . when the contract is made
if it is for the sale of goods already existing and identified." Id.§ 2-501(1)(a). The Code uses the
word "identify" in this definition in the first instance as a term of art and in the second in its usual
sense.
16. Id. § 9-311.
17. The comments refer to it as "legal title or an equity." Id. Comment 1.
18. Id. § 2-501(1). See also id. § 2-401(1).
19. Id. § 1-201(37). See also id. § 9-113, Comment 4.
20. Id. § 2-401, Comment 3.
21. Id. § 2-401. See also id. § 9-202, Comment; § 2-505, Comment 1.
22. The following table illustrates the general Code scheme for allocating interests and priorities between the seller's creditor and the buyer. The table also designates the event on which
the rights arise.
I

II

III

IV

Creditor

Critical Event

Buyers who win

Buyers who lose

A. Unsecured

Identification of goods to
the sale [§2-501(1)]

All, except certain "fraudulent"
buyers 1§2-402(2)]

None, except certain
"fraudulent" buyers [§ 2402(2)1

B. Secured but unperfected

Attachment of the security
interest [§ 9-203(2)] and identification ofthe goods to
the sale I§ 2-501(1)] and
(sometimes) delivery to the
buyer [§ 9-301(i(c)]

(a) All buyers if the sale is
authorized [§ 9-306(2)];
(b) Buyers in ordinary course
[§ 9-307(1)1;
(c) Buyers not in ordinary
course who take delivery without knowledge of the security
interest [§ 9-301(1)(c)]

All buyers not listed in
B(III) [§ 9-201, -306(2)]

C. Secured and perfected

Same as B(II) above and
perfection of the security
interests [9-303(l))

(a) All buyers if the sale is
authorized [§9-306(2)];
(b) Buyers in ordinary course,
except those who buy farm
products from farmers [§ 9307(l)]

All buyers not listed in
CQII) [§§9-201, -306(2))

See note 107 infra; U.C.C. §§ 7-205, -504(2). The rights of lien creditors appear to depend on
non-Code notions. See In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960). Generally, the non-Code
rules follow strict security of property doctrine. See In re Federals, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 515 (6th
Cir. 1977); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968). For a criticism of this
non-Code approach, see Jackson & Peters, Questfor Uncertainty:A ProposalforFlexible Resolution ofInherent Conflicts Between Article2 andArticle 9 ofthe Uniform CommercialCode, 87 YALE
L. 907, 937 (1978).
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The SpecialProperty Interest

The special property interest rule is a contemporary version of the
ancient security of property principle. That conveyancing precept,
sometimes called an "umbrella" or "shelter" principle, is common to
other Code articles.23 In the past, case law and statutes used a wide
range of terms in formulating it;2 4 Article 2, recognizing the confusion
to which earlier terminology led, employs the phrase "special property
interest" for this "qualified interest" 25 in goods. Section 2-501, which
creates the special property interest, states only that unless otherwise
agreed a buyer acquires it at the moment goods are identified to a contract of sale. We must consult other Code sections2 6 -notably the
buyer remedy provisions of Article 2 and the buyer protection provisions of Articles 2 and 9-to learn what rights the interest embraces.
The buyer remedy and protection provisions are linked to the special
property interest by their frequent references to the event of identification2 7 in determining the priority of claims to disputed goods by
seller/creditor, buyer/debtor and takers under the debtor. The sections do not use the phrase "special property interest" itself. The absence of explicit cross references has misled some courts.
Under the Code, a negative implication of the security of property
principle also survives. Normally, a transferee gets whatever rights the
transferor enjoys, and, by negative implication, no more than that.
The Code departs from this view, however, as the common law eventually did, conferring additional rights on the good faith purchaser.
When these rights accrue is the first question courts confronted in dealing with the special property interest.
A leading case is Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 28 in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied replevin to a buyer of undelivered
goods, some of which were arguably identified to the contract. Resorting to the defmition of "sale" in section 2-106 as the "passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price," the court reasoned that a party
does not become a "buyer"' 29 for buyer in ordinary course purposes
until title passes to him.3" Since passage of title generally abides deliv23. See note 6 supra.
24. See Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAw Q. REv. 481, 484, 490 (1886).
25. 0. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 244.
26. See U.C.C. § 2-401, Comment 3.
27. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-402, -502, -716.
28. 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
29. The Chrysler court does not dwell on the question, but one cannot help wondering what
to call, before title passes, the party who becomes the buyer after title passes. The Chrysler court
called it "Chrysler." There is an irresistible temptation to call that party the "buyer."
30. 59 Wis. 2d at 241, 208 N.W.2d at 106. Cf.Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d
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ery of the goods,3 1 that holding and others like it postpone the time at
which a purchaser benefits from the good faith purchase doctrine from
the moment of identification to that of delivery. The Wisconsin
court's reliance on the Article 2 definition of "sale," however, did not
take into account the statute's definition of "buyer" as one "who buys
or contracts to buy goods"3z -a definition that does not mention either
title or delivery. Nor did the court take into account that section 2716, the buyer remedy section that permits replevin under some cir33
cumstances, specifically refers to goods "identified to the contract.
If a buyer has no replevin rights until title passes, as Chrysler held,
identification, since
there is no need for the replevin section to mention
34
identification must occur before title passes.
The Chrysler court, however, offered substantive grounds for its
decision. Noting disagreement among commentators,3 5 it recognized
that the Code stresses, on the one hand, the notice function of a filing
and, on the other, actual possession of goods. A holding in favor of the
buyer would subject inventory in the seller's possession to a claim of
the buyer, arguably to the confusion of the seller's creditor who might
reasonably rely on the seller's possession.36 This concern, urged in an
amicus brief filed by a commercial finance and factoring industry trade
association,3 7 reflects a proper regard for the role of possession in the
common law. It is a concern, nonetheless, that courts must abandon in
the face of evidence that the legislature has deviated from the common
law's course.
Evidence to that effect abounds. First, as Professors Warren and
Gilmore point out,38 the Code patterns section 9-307(1), one of the
391, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1978) (relying on the definition of "sale" in denying relief to a buyer who
argued authorized sale under § 9-306(2)(b)); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western,
90 Misc. 2d 868, 870-71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (positing the same rule but finding
constructive delivery and holding, therefore, that U.C.C. § 9-307(1) applies in favor of the buyer).
For contrary authority, see note 42 infra.

31. U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
32. Id. § 2-103(1)(a) (emphasis supplied).
33. Id. § 2-716(3).
... Id.
34. Id. § 2-401(1). "Title to goods cannot pass ... prior to their identification.
35. 59 Wis. 2d at 239, 208 N.W.2d at 106-07. The court was apparently moved by the fact
that one author has criticized Article 2 because it did not extend buyer in ordinary course protection to a buyer who has not taken delivery. Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 10 BOSTON C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 39, 60-61 (1968). Other authority takes the position advocated in this Article, that buyer in ordinary course protection may
extend to one who does not take possession. See note 42 infra.
36. 59 Wis. 2d at 240-41, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
37. Id. at 240, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
38. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS rN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.6, at 696 (1965); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Unform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv.
469, 473 (1963). But see Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 955.
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chief buyer in ordinary course rules, after section 9-2(a) of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, which protected buyers "to whom goods are sold
and delivered. . . ."9 Yet section 9-307(1) does not mention delivery.
These authorities conclude that the omission of the delivery feature of
the rule was intentional.'
Second, section 2-402(1) recognizes that
certain rights of buyers, superior to those of some creditors of the seller,
arise at the moment of identification." Third, section 2-402(2) limits
the buyer's rights against any creditor if under local law the seller's
retention of the goods is fraudulent; the subsection further provides
that a merchant seller's retention of goods "in good faith and current
course of trade for a commercially reasonable time. . . is not fraudulent." Thus, the Code implies not only that a buyer becomes a buyer
at the time of identification, rather than the time of delivery, but also
that creditors must assume that merchant sellers-the sellers to whom
section 9-307(1), the Article 9 buyer in ordinary course rule, applies-may retain possession of sold goods for a commercially reasonable period of time. Some courts, accepting this analysis, have held

that a 42buyer need not take possession to be a buyer in ordinary
course.

Nothing in this discussion suggests that the special property interest carries paramount rights with it.4 3 Section 2-501 says only that the
buyer obtains an interest at the time of identification. The scope and
relative priority of that interest depend on other Code sections. 44 Most

importantly, they depend on the three rules that appear in part 4 of
Article 2, the rules on title,45 creditors,

6

and good faith purchasers. 47

39. UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § I (emphasis added).
40. For a more complete discussion of this reasoning in a work that serves as persuasive
"legislative history" for the Code, see REPORT OF THE [N.Y.] COMM'N FOR 1955 STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 232, 239-42.

41. This rule assumes added significance in light of the policy of U.C.C. § 2-501 that identification occur early in the performance of the contract. See id. § 2-501, Comments 2, 4, & 6.
42. The courts, however, couch their rules in title language.. See Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile
America Corp., 580 P.2d 8,10 (Ariz. App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (1968).
43. Thus, for example, a holding in the Chrysler case that the buyer became a buyer at the
time the goods were identified does not automatically mean that the buyer could replevy the
goods. Sections 2-502(1) and 2-716(l) define such rights. Similarly, if the plaintiff in Chrysler
had been the buyer's creditor, instead of the buyer, the creditor's rights find their limit in the rights
of-the buyer, unless the creditor qualifies for good faith purchase treatment. Cf.note 159 infra
(discussing rights of buyer's creditor against reclaiming seller).
44. See, ag., U.C.C. §§ 2-402(1), -403, -711, -722, 7-205, 9-306(2), -307(1).
45. Id. § 2-401 sets forth the general title rules.
46. Id. § 2-402 sets forth the general rules for allocating rights in goods between seller's
creditors and buyers.
47. Id. § 2-403 includes the special rules of actual authority, apparent authority, voidable
title, and good faith purchase.
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This analysis concludes that the Code makes identification the key
48
event.
The dispute over the choice between identification and passage of
title as a reference point often centers on pro-buyer or pro-secured
party arguments. In Chrysler, the National Commercial Finance Conference, Inc. argued that the identification rule is contrary to the ostensible ownership of the seller and would be unfair to the credit
industry.4 9 Commentators, on the other hand, have argued that the
Code leaves prepaying buyers vulnerable.5 0 There is of course no way
to satisfy both sides of the argument. The Code must strike a balance

somehow, and any solution will offend some lenders and some buyers.
The moment of identification certainly is a happier choice as the
reference point than title passage or delivery, which generally occur

simultaneously late in the transaction. By opting for identification, the
Code appears to promote the interests of buyers. In fact, it promotes
the interests of a commercial society. It fosters sales. It encourages
buyers to buy and pay early. The argument that the rule discourages
lending misses the point. For lenders as a class, the selection of an
early reference point rather than a later one makes no difference. The
rules of Article 951 to an extent may operate in conjunction with the
identification rule to defeat the security interest of the seller's secured
party, but to the same extent section 9-20352 provides that a buyer's
48. One must be mindful that some decisions reflect an unwillingness to extend the scheme of
Article 2 to buyer/secured party disputes arising under Article 9. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 650 (Del. 1972), which holds that the merchant good faith rule of
Article 2 does not apply to buyers seeking the protection of the Article 9 buyer protection rule, § 9307(1). This Article does not deal with that controversy but does assume that fashioning a different scheme when good faith purchase rules involve the rights of secured parties would serve no
purpose or policy. This position is consistent with the plan of Article 2. Section 2-402(3) states
that the rules of Article 2 do not impair the rights of a secured party. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 2 (second paragraph, fourth sentence) (the Article 2 entrustment rule is subject to the farm
products exception of§ 9-307(l)). This Article does not interpret Article 2 as impairingthe rights
of a secured creditor. While it does use the article in determining the time at which the buyer
defeats the secured party, it also uses the article in determining the time at which the secured party
defeats the buyer. It is Article 9, through §§ 9-306(2) and 9-307(1), that impairs the rights of the
secured party. The role of Article 2 in providing the reference point is neutral. Attempts to
apply Article 9 exclusively to disputes between buyers, sellers, and secured parties have led to
questionable reasoning and results. See notes 142-46 infra & accompanying text.
49. 59 Wis. 2d at 240, 208 N.W.2d at 107. For the view that modem inventory lenders tend
not to rely on debtor possession in extending credit, see Gordon, The PrepayingBuyer: Second
Class Citizenship Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 565, 577-78
(1968).
50. See Gordon, supra note 49; Smith, supra note 35. Biut see Spiedel, Advance Payments in
ContractsforSale fManufacturedGoods:A Look at the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CALIF. L.
REv. 281 (1964) (suggesting a way for the well-advised prepaying buyer to protect himself under
the provisions of Article 9).
51. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), -307(1).
52. Under the 1962 Code, § 9-204(1) was the applicable provision.
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secured party cannot obtain a security interest in goods until the buyer
has an interest in them. By deeming that interest to arise early, the
Code hastens the time when the buyer's secured party can look to new
property of the buyer.
Commercial law should defer to the expectations possession
arouses, absent compelling reasons to the contrary. The identification
rule makes the buyer's interest arise while the goods remain in the
seller's possession. Thus the seller's creditor might rely on that possession to his detriment. This consequence appears to be a heavy burden
on the seller's creditor and, more importantly for the purposes of this
Article, runs counter to the force of traditional possession rules. The
role of the identification rule, however, is the limited one of fixing a
point of reference. The conveyancing rules of Articles 2 and 9, not the

identification rule, allocate economic risk. Section 2-402(2)," moreover, permits other state law to impose a time limit on the operation of

the identification rule.54 In some jurisdictions" a buyer who leaves
identified goods with a seller for more than a commercially reasonable
time cannot defeat any of the seller's creditors. While other states may
not have this common law rule for section 2-402(2) to defer to, nothing
some
prevents the courts of those states from fashioning one. Indeed,
56

might construe section 2-402(2) as an invitation to do so.

The system of rights built on the identification rule, moreover,
parallels that of Article 9 inventory rules.51 The holder of a security
53. The rule of§ 2-402(2) codifies the ostensible ownership doctrine that renders fraudulent a
trader's conveyance without surrender of possession. See Ryall v. Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074
(Ch. 1749).
54. U.C.C. § 2-402(2) provides:
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract for
sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under
any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except that retention of possession in. good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially
reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent.
55. See, e.g., Edwards v. Harber, 100 Eng. Rep. 315, 321 (K.B. 1788). See generally 1 G.
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 354 (rev. ed. 1940).
56. There remains one ghost to be laid to rest. Nothing in the argument advanced in the text
supports the claim of a creditor of an insolvent buyer who has not paid for identified, undelivered
goods. Under § 2-702(3) such a good faith creditor should defeat the seller's right of reclamation
under the voidable title rule of § 2-403(1). That rule applies, however, only if the goods are
delivered. Voidable title is a rule of title, and title does not generally pass until delivery. In any
event, to the extent that goods have not been delivered, the seller need not resort to his right to
reclaim under § 2-702 but can resort to his seller's lien as provided in § 2-507(2), a lien which the
Code does not make subject to the claims of good faith purchasers who have not taken delivery.
See also § 2-703(a) & (t). In Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), the court held that § 2-403(1) subjects the seller's lien to the
rights of third parties. That holding is correct if under state law the buyer had voidable title.
Voidable title doctrine should apply, however, only if the buyer has received delivery, as in
Stowers. See text accompanying notes 139-46 infra.
57. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), -307(l); text accompanying notes 68-70 infra.
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interest in inventory cannot long rely on a debtor's possession because
the debtor may soon sell the collateral or have sold it already. Reli-

ance on a debtor's possession of inventory is always precarious. An
inventory check on Monday will not protect against sales on Tuesday;

neither can it undo previous sales made within a commercially reasonable time. As sections 9-306(2) and 9-307(1) teach, inventory lenders
need to know something about the borrower's inventory and5 8marketing
practices. The role of identification accentuates that need.
Another limitation on the effect of the identification rule on expectations arising out of possession lies in the fact that the rule relates only
to sales from inventory. Buyers may use identification against sellers
of noninventory items including equipment, consumer goods, or farm
products; but unless the securedpartyauthorized a sale, buyers of those
business of
goods cannot defeat him. Only buyers from a person in the
59
selling goods of that kind benefit from section 9-307(1).
These conclusions notwithstanding, Chrysler typifies the approach
of many courts that remain unpersuaded and seem to prefer the title
route60 or the delivery route61 for determining the time when the
buyer's rights arise.62 The Tanbro case illustrates the operation of
these special property rules and one court's reluctance to accept them.
D.

Application of Special PropertyInterest Rules to Tanbro

Under the foregoing analysis of the special property interest, Tanbro acquired a special property interest in the goods in which Deering
enjoyed a prior perfected security interest. Under classic security of
58. Thus in the Chrysler case it was incumbent upon the creditor of the seller to know that
several items, which comprised a significant portion of the seller's inventory, were already paid
for. Those familiar with inventory financing must admit that careful inventory creditors insist on
this kind of sales information.
59. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 9-307(1).
60. See, e.g., Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 1978); Wood
Chevrolet Co. v. Bank of the Southeast, 352 So. 2d 1350, 1352 (Ala. 1977); CIT Financial Services
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 So. 2d 125, 126 (Miss. 1977); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland
Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. First
Security Bank, 534 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975); National Exch. Bank v. Mann, 81 Wis. 2d 352, 362, 260
N.W.2d 716,720 (1978). Contra, Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 580 P.2d 8, 10 (Ariz. App.
1978). Cf. Richards & Assoc., Inc. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Corp. (In re Tennessee Steel
Corp.), 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 326,329-30 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (using both identification and title to
rule for the buyer). For a different view from that advanced in the text, see Anzivino, !hen Does
a Debtor Have Rights in the Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 61
MARQ. L. REv. 23 (1977).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1974);
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidewell Indus. Inc., 115 Ariz. 362, 565 P.2d 868, 870 (1977); First
Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 80-81, 286 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1972).
62. But see, e.g., Goldberg Co. v. County Green Ltd. Partnership (In re County Green Ltd.
Partnership), 438 F. Supp. 693, 696 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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property principles Deering would prevail. Mill, which had encumbered its property, could give Tanbro only the interest Mill retained,63
an interest subject to Deering's security interest. The Code, however,
subjects the general security of property notion to a number of exceptions in favor of those who purchase goods, 64 instruments, 65 documents,66 and chattel paper.67 Of these, two bear on the Tanbro
controversy.
The first creates an exception to the rule that a security interest
follows goods into the hands of the purchaser, in the event that "the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise. 68 In particular, if the secured party authorizes the
debtor to sell the goods, the secured party loses his security interest. 9
It is of no moment that the secured party intends to retain his security
interest.
The Deering fabric was inventory, for both Deering and Tanbro,

and since the purpose of inventory is sale in most situations, section 9306(2) serves to protect the interest of the purchaser against that of the
secured party. 0
By delivering the first shipment of 57,000 yards of fabric to Tanbro's affiliate, Deering authorized the disposition to Tanbro. 7 1 It
63. Non dat qui non habet. Mill could not give what it did not have. Latinists may (and
may not) prefer nemo plus juris in alium transferrepotest quam opse habet, Wheelwright v.
Depeyster, I John. 471, 479 (N.Y. 1806).
64. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(c), -306(2), -307.
65. Id. §§ 9-301(1)(c), -306(2), -308, -309.
66. Id. §§ 9-301(l)(c), -306(2), -309.
67. Id. §§ 9-301(l)(c), -306(2), -308.
68. Id. § 9-306(2) (emphasis added). The 1972 version of this subsection differs slightly
from the 1962 version. The difference does not affect the argument advanced here.
69. See, e.g., Farmers Natl Bank v. Ceres Land Co., 32 Colo.App. 290, 293, 512 P.2d 1174,
App. 2d 324, 329, 241 N.E.2d 342, 345
1176 (1973); Draper v. Minneapolis-Moline, Inc., 100 11M.
(1968). Contra, United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
App. 2d 190, 194, 249
U.S. 909 (1964); Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, 111 IIll.
N.E.2d 352, 354 (1969). See generalo 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 38, § 26.11 (1965). See also
U.C.C. § 9-306(2), Comment 3 (1962 version).
70. If the lender does not authorize a sale, § 9-307(1) fulfills the reasonable expectations of a
good faith buyer. A buyer in ordinary course takes free even of a known security interest, unless
he knows that the sale violates the security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2. The provision specifically excepts from its operation farmers' sales of farm products. Id. Farm products
are not "inventory" under the Code. Id. § 9-103(3). Farm security agreements traditionally do
not authorize farmer debtors to sell crops and livestock that secure agricultural loans.
71. By delivery, Deering also lost the benefit of perfected status. Without any filed financing statement, delivery of this collateral to the debtor or a third party renders the secured party
unperfected unless the delivery is protected under the twenty-one day rule of§ 9-304(5). A buyer
who takes delivery of the collateral without notice of an unperfected security interest defeats the
secured party under § 9-301(l)(c). A buyer, not a buyer in ordinary course, who knows of the
security interet, as Tanbro did, would lose to an unperfected secured party such as Deering. See
text accompanying notes 14-22 supra.

1160

Concept of Possession in Marketing
might have been argued that Deering authorized the sale not only of
the 57,000 yards it delivered but also of the 203,000 it continued to
hold, on the grounds that Deering was aware of the industry practice of
resale among converters, that Deering shipped the first 57,000 yards to
Tanbro's affiliate on Mill's instructions, and that Deering salespeople
had first informed Tanbro that Mill had fabric to sell. The success of
the argument would turn on the facts and the characterization of Deering's concern for the fabric as arising only when Mill's insolvency became evident. If Deering had authorized the sale and attempted to
revoke that authorization after Mill had entered into the contract with
Tanbro, ie., after Tanbro had obtained a special property interest in
the goods, its revocation would come too late;72 section 9-306(2) would
yield a result in favor of Tanbro.
The opinions, however, do not discuss this argument. The trial
court directed a verdict on the issue of liability at the close of the evidence. The New York Court of Appeals recognized that Tanbro could
succeed under section 9-306(2) if "the sale was not unauthorized, '7 3 but
chose instead to bottom its decision on section 9-307(1) when it characterized the issue as "whether Tanbro's purchase of goods was in the
74
ordinary course of Mill's business ....
III.

Financing Devices Affected by the New York Rule

Tanbro unsettles commercial lawyers, not because it favors buyers
over lenders, but because it ignores the reasonable expectations of lenders and promotes careless or even deceptive conduct on the part of buyers. The case will not inevitably undermine the structure of
commercial finance or increase transaction costs dramatically. It will,
however, disturb modern commercial practices and needlessly reward
unsuspecting parties, without any concomitant benefit. Widespread
commercial practices presuppose that possession of goods signifies
power to sell the goods and that lack of possession signifies want of that

72. The facts may justify this scenario. It appears that Deering was not concerned with
Mill's creditworthiness during 1969. Deering made credit advances to Mill totalling $300,000
after May 1969. In October and November of the same year Deering delivered 57,000 yards of
fabric to Tanbro's affiliate at a time when Mill owed Deering more than $115,000. Mill sold the
fabric at $.26/yard. In fact, when Tanbro sought delivery of the 203,000 yards of fabric, Deering
asked for a cash deposit of only $50,000. Thus, unless Deering held other collateral that the
opinions do not mention, it held fabric valued at far less than Mill's debt in November 1969 when
Deering shipped the 57,000 yards.
73. Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 636, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592,
385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (1976).
74. Id. at 634, 350 N.E.2d at 591, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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power. This presupposition is manifest in both the marketing and financing of goods.
This Part and Part IV will examine a long list of credit transactions
encompassed by the Code's possession-oriented scheme for protecting
creditors, debtors, and debtors' takers. The purpose of the section divisions is to stress that the New York rule adversely affects some of these
financing arrangements, despite what would otherwise seem to be the
Code's intent, while others survive unharmed. This Part explains how
the New York rule undermines credit arrangements based on the use of
the pledge, field warehousing, and repossession; the next Part describes
thirteen devices preserved or originated by the Code, to which the New
York rule does not apply. Both sections, however, serve to illustrate
the breadth of the Code's respect for expectations based on possession
and the great extent to which the New York rule could disturb the
Code's underlying plan. Part V is devoted to the "thief rule," an exception to possession-oriented rules that is preserved by the Code for
reasons of paramount social policy. Taken together, these Parts permit
a recasting of the issue the New York rule raises: it is not simply
whether a buyer in ordinary course should defeat a creditor in possession, but whether, given the role possession plays in commercial law
and the Code's evident acceptance and refinement of that role, courts
can justifiably create a new exception to security of property principles
that defies this history and disappoints possession-based expectations.
A.

Pledge

The pledge, an ancient personal property security device,7 5 is an
arrangement whereby the creditor deprives his debtor of possession of
the collateral.7 6 It is the general rule that a pledge fails absent delivery
to the creditor77 or his agent,7" and expires when the creditor surrenders the collateral to the debtor.7 9 The Code recognizes these rules in
75. See Code of Hammurabi 118.
76. The deprivation is fundamental to the pledge. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 15.1 (3d ed. 1975). There have long been two types of chattel security devices, one
requiring possession, the other nonpossessory. Some authorities have used "pledge" as a broad
term encompassing both possessory and nonpossessory chattel security arrangements. The common-law pledge, however, is a possessory security interest. See Gilmore & Axelrod, ChattelSecurity: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 521-23 (1948); Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: 4 Study in Comfparative
LegalIdeas 11I,11 HARv. L. REV. 18 (1897). See also 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING
SALES OF GOODS § 338a (rev. ed. 1948); 3 id. § 515.
77. Wilson v. Little, 2 N.Y. 443, 446-47 (1849).
78. Accord, R. HENSON, HANDBOOK. ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 60 (1973); cafU.C.C. § 9-305, Comment 2 (possession may be by an agent for
the secured party, but the debtor or a person controlled by him cannot qualify as the agent).
79. Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 477, 478, 480 (1877); Bodenhammer v. Newsom, 50 N.C.
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sections 9-203 and 9-305, which permit creation and perfection of a
security interest by possession. Significantly, these provisions do not
extend to the types of collateral, accounts and general intangibles, possession of which cannot be transferred."0 Pledge rules rest not on metaphysical considerations but on the realities of commercial
expectations. It was reasonable for a medieval creditor to assume that
his merchant debtor could not sell wares held by the creditor and
equally reasonable for the medieval buyer to resist sales efforts by a
peddler with an empty cart. Modem creditors have found safety in
possession of collateral and modem buyers are reluctant to pay cash for
goods they cannot see. By protecting the creditor in possession, the
common law and the Code defer to these realities.
Possession by the creditor or his agent and lack of possession by
the debtor serve the twofold purpose of any security device: they protect the creditor against use or sale of the collateral by the debtor and
warn purchasers against giving value for goods subject to a security
interest.
The common-law pledge permitted a number of exceptions to the
general rule that the creditor must deprive the debtor of possession.
As a general rule, the release of collateral to the debtor for services that
benefited the creditor did not terminate the pledge.8 " Common-law
courts, however, recognized the commercial peril of permitting the
lender to surrender the collateral and mislead third parties who might
rely on the debtor's possession. It was the rule, therefore, that these
third parties would defeat the pledge.8" Article 9 greatly limits the circumstances in which a pledgee may surrender possession to the debtor
and still retain a security interest.8 3 In various circumstances, the purchaser's ignorance or incomplete knowledge of the security interest
defeats or subordinates that interest.8 4
The implications of Tanbro for the pledge are obvious. If the trier
of fact finds it "ordinary" in a given industry for parties to effect
purchases and sales without the buyer's taking delivery, the pledge becomes no better than a security interest perfected by filing. Neither
perfection by possession nor perfection by filing protect the creditor
(5 Jones) 107, 109 (1857). Courts, however, distinguished between mortgages of personalty and
pledges of personalty, using a title theory to permit redelivery to the debtor in mortgage situations
without loss of the mortgage lien. See, e.g., Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467 (1877).
80. U.C.C. § 9-305 & Comment 1.
81. Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 480 (1877); RESTATEMENT OF SECURTY § 11(2) (1941).
82. Bodenhammer v. Newsom, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 107, 109 (1857); RESTATEMENT OF SECURry § 11(2), Comment c, at 40.
83. U.C.C. § 9-304(4) & (5).
84. See id. §§ 9-307, -308, -309.
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from sales by the debtor-a conclusion contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties.
B.

Field Warehousing

Modem creditors frequently employ a variant of the pledge that
involves warehouse receipts. Under the Code, creditors may take a
security interest in inventory and perfect by filing a financing statement.8" The perfected security interest falls, however, before the interest of a buyer in ordinary course,8 6 since such a buyer reasonably
expects to take free and clear. Sections 9-306(2) and 9-307(1) provide
that most buyers will prevail in these circumstances.8 7 Inventory lenders, aware of the open market effects of these sections but unwilling to
use the bulky pledge procedure, have utilized field warehousing to
avoid those effects. The field warehouseman operates a manned physical enclosure located at the debtor's place of business and acts as the
creditor's agent. The warehouseman takes possession of the debtor's
inventory and issues warehouse receipts in nonnegotiable form directly
to the creditor. The debtor grants the creditor a security interest, and
the creditor perfects by one of the three methods permitted in section 9304(3). The field warehouse agent on the debtor's premises may re8
lease collateral to the debtor only upon the creditor's instructions.1
The purpose of the field warehouse is thus not to secure the creditor. Article 9 permits creditors to acquire a security interest and perfect it with a simple security agreement and financing statement,
without the cost and inconvenience of the physical enclosure, nonnegotiable receipts, and delivery orders.8 9 Creditors incur the expense of
field warehousing not for the purpose of creating or perfecting a security interest but in order to deprive the debtor of possession. They
choose to deprive him of possession, moreover, not because they fear
he will use the inventory but because they fear he will sell it and that
buyers in ordinary course will use section 9-307(1) to defeat the secured
party. The field warehouse is a collateral policing device that permits
85. Id. §§ 9-203, -302.
86. Id. § 1-201(9) defines a "buyer in ordinary course" as "a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of
a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind .... "
87. Under § 9-306(2) any buyer, except certain fraudulent buyers, will prevail over the secured party who authorizes the sale. See U.C.C. § 2-402(2). See also note 22 supra.
88. To release collateral without authorization will generally render the field warehouse liable. See U.C.C. § 7-403.
89. Id. §§ 9-203, -204. Professor Henson notes that "an aura of esoterica" still surrounds
field warehousing. R. HENsoN, supra note 78, at 62 n.21.
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the creditor to control the amount of collateral available to satisfy his
security interest.
The New York rule announced in Tanbro has the effect of providing every buyer with a key to the field warehouse lock. By proving
buyer in ordinary course status, a buyer under the Tanbro rule can
defeat the secured party who deprived his debtor of possession precisely in order to avoid the buyer in ordinary course difficulty.
C

Repossession

In many, if not most, instances the classic pledge and the field
warehouse will not fit the needs of the borrower and his secured party.
Usually creditors cannot maintain possession of equipment that the
borrower uses or inventory that he sells. Field warehousing entails
start-up and handling costs that the debtor may not be willing to bear.
Most inventory security interests are nonpossessory: the debtor
holds the collateral, and the secured party either resorts to such policing efforts as periodic inspection or certified credit, or relies on the integrity of his borrower. In the event of default, most security
agreements and the Code itself provide that the secured party may take
possession of the collateral 90 and sell it free of the debtor's interest. 9'
ie., simple retenIn some instances the Code permits strict foreclosure,
92
tion of the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.
This process of repossession serves two purposes. First, it is a prerequisite to depriving the debtor of his title, either by sale or by strict
foreclosure. Second, it prevents the debtor from alienating the collateral. Tanbro undermines both functions. If a debtor without possession may sell to a buyer in ordinary course who can defeat the secured
party, creditor repossession affords no protection. One effect of
Tanbro may be to promote quick sale by the secured party in order to
beat buyers in ordinary course. These sales might be commercially
reasonable, 93 given the danger of debtor sales to a buyer in ordinary
course, but low selling prices could result in loss to the secured party
and the debtor.9 4
90. U.C.C. § 9-503.
91. Id. § 9-504.

92. Id. § 9-505(2).
93. Failure of the secured party to sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner
will jeopardize his claim for a deficiency and may expose him to liability to the debtor. See, e.g.,
Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1972); Camden
Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1973).
94. This danger may apply only to inventory loans. There is authority holding that a buyer
of used equipment in an incidental sale cannot rise to the level of a buyer in ordinary course.
Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317,320 (1970).

1165

Texas Law Review

Vol. 56:1147, 1978

IV. Transactions Not Affected by the New York Rule
Tanbro rejects the idea that a seller must be in possession for his
taker to attain buyer in ordinary course status. Evaluation of that
judgment requires analysis not only of the three commercial practices
already discussed, pledges, field warehousing, and repossession, but
also of other rules that have evolved in the long effort to temper the
baleful effects of the security of property principle. The following
analysis will suggest that the implications of possession are at the bottom of this long effort and that Tanbro is a significant and ill-advised
departure from a reasonable limit on good faith purchase rules.
A.

Negotiable Documents of Title

As in field warehousing, the rules of commodity paper generally
proceed on the assumption that possession by a bailee provides protection to the person entitled to the goods under the terms of the document. In agricultural commodity transactions, grain elevators and gin
companies frequently issue negotiable warehouse receipts to true owners who use the negotiable documents" in the financing and marketing
of their goods. With sections 7-501 to 7-509, the Code systematically
protects the interests of a "holder to whom these negotiable documents
of title are duly negotiated" (a "qualified holder"). 96 Such holders
take title to the goods free of most claims.97 In fact, the Code provides
for only two instances where the qualified holder loses.
Under section 7-205 a qualified holder loses to a buyer in ordinary
course who takes delivery of fungible goods from a warehouse in the
business of selling those goods. 98 Section 7-205 is thus a good faith
purchase section that favors buyers over secured parties. The second
exception is a security of property rule. Section 7-503 prevents a thief
or other unauthorized party from bailing goods and passing good title
to a qualified holder. It affirms the paramount rights of persons whose
interests arise prior to the bailment and who are in no way estopped 99
Hempstead rejects the argument that a car rental company that customarily sells its vehicles after
having leased them is "in the business of selling goods of that kind," within the meaning of § I209(9). Accordingly, buyers of vehicles from the car rental company would not be buyers in
ordinary course. Most sales by a business of its equipment would not constitute sales by a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind.
95. U.C.C. § 1-201(15).
96. Id. § 7-501(4) sets forth the requirements for negotiation.

97. Id. § 7-502.
98. Cf. In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 96, 106 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (the court uses
the doctrine of voidable title to achieve this result).
99. U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(a) & (b). See United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 814 n.34 (5th Cir.
1971).
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from asserting their paramount position.
Arguably, under Tanbro a true owner who has bailed his goods
and granted a security interest in them by conveying a negotiable document of title to his bank can sell those goods to a buyer in ordinary
course, and the buyer, who does not take possession, prevails. That
implication, however, flies in the face of the language of section 9-309,
which provides that "[n]othing in this Article limits the rights of. . .a
holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated. . . ." , While the main thrust of the section relates to persons
with nonpossessory security interests in such documents,' 0 1 its plain
language forbids courts from applying section 9-307(1) against secured
parties who are also qualified holders.' 2 Tanbro, then, should not affect the rights of qualified holders.
Documentary Drafts
In the simplest form of documentary draft transaction,10 3 a seller
ships goods by a carrier from whom he obtains a negotiable bill of
lading. The seller forwards the bill, along with a draft, through the
banking chain. The collecting bank presents the draft to the buyer.
When the buyer honors the draft, the bank surrenders the bill of lading,.
and the buyer can obtain the goods from the carrier when the shipment
arrives.
The documentary draft benefits both buyer and seller. The seller
knows that without the bill the buyer will not obtain the goods because
the carrier will not deliver them except to the holder of the bill." The
seller also takes comfort from the fact that the bank will not deliver the
bill to the buyer unless the buyer honors the seller's draft. 05 The
buyer, in turn, willingly honors the draft because he knows that possession of the negotiable bill is tantamount to possession of the goods.
B.

100. U.C.C. § 9-309 (emphasis added).
101. See id. Comment 2 (second sentence).
102. Professor Skilton makes this point in Skilton, Buyer in OrdinaryCourse of Business Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (andRelated Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 48-49.
103. For an explanation in more detail of this transaction and its variables, see Farnsworth,
DocumentaryDrafts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 479 (1967).
104. In the event the carrier surrenders the goods to someone other than the qualified holder,
the carrier will be liable. U.C.C. § 7-403. Cf.Turner v. Scobey Moving & Storage Co., 515
S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. 1974) (warehouse liable for misdelivery of goods covered by a nonnegotiable receipt).
105. A bank that delivers the bill of lading before the buyer honors the draft exposes itself to

liability for any losses the buyer sustains. See U.C.C. §§ 4-202(1), -204(2) & Comment 3, -211(1);
V' Pere Marquette Ry. v. J.F. French & Co., 254 U.S. 538 (1921) (pre-Code dictum to the same

effect).
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Tanbro does not affect the assumptions of the buyer in documentary draft transactions. First, many buyers who receive a documentary
draft will qualify as holders to whom a negotiable document of title has
been duly negotiated. 0 6 They will benefit from section 9-309, as explained in Part V(A). In addition, because Tanbro rests on section 9307(1), it applies only to buyers in ordinary course asserting claims in
conflict with securedparties,not in conflict with other buyers. Consequently, if a seller, after delivering goods to the carrier and sending the
bill of lading through the banking chain, attempts to sell to a second

buyer, the second buyer will lose to the first.
C. Article 2 Security Interests
Under section 2-505, which codifies part of the common law lien
for unpaid sellers, a seler reserves a security interest in goods that he
ships under a bill of lading reflecting his interest in the goods.10 7 His
security interest terminates upon surrender to the buyer of the document of title if it is negotiable, 0 8 or delivery of the goods if it is nonnegotiable. 10 9 Until surrender or delivery, however, the buyer cannot
defeat the security interest by selling to a third party. Even though,

106. U.C.C. § 7-501 provides:
(1) A negotiable document of title running to the order of a named person is negotiated by his indorsement and delivery. After his indorsement in blank or to bearer any
person can negotiate it by delivery alone.
(2) (a) A negotiable document of title is also negotiated by delivery alone when
by its original terms it runs to bearer.
(b) When a document running to the order of a named person person is
delivered to him the effect is the same as if the document had been negotiated.
(3) Negotiation of a negotiable document of title after it has been indorsed to a
specified person requires indorsement by the special indorsee as well as delivery.
(4) A negotiable document of title is "duly negotiated" when it is negotiated in the
manner stated in this section to a holder who purchases it in good faith without notice of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person and for value, unless it is
established that the negotiation is not in the regular course of business or financing or
involves receiving the document in settlement or payment of a money obligation.
(5) Indorsement of a non-negotiable document neither makes it negotiable nor
adds to the transferees rights.
(6) The naming in a negotiable bill of a person to be notified of the arrival of the
goods does not limit the negotiability of the bill nor constitute notice to a purchaser
thereof of any interest of such person in the goods.
107. The purpose of§ 2-505 is to overcome the common-law notion that the seller either loses
all interest in the goods when he delivers them to the carrier or retains title. See U.C.C. § 2-505,
Comment 1. The section is consistent with this Article's view that title is irrelevant in sales and
secured transactions. See text accompanying notes 239-43 infra. When the goods are identified
to the contract, the buyer obtains a special property interest. When the seller ships them under
reservation, he obtains a security interest. Title has no bearing on the rights of the buyer and the
seller as against each other.
108. See U.C.C. §§ 7-502, -503, -504.
109. See id. § 2-505(l)(b) & Comment 3.
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under Tanbro, the buyer's taker may be a buyer in ordinary course, he
will not defeat an Article 2 security interest (since any Article 2 security
interest will have been created by operation of law rather than by his
seller). Section 9-307(1) permits the buyer in ordinary course to prevail only over security interests created by "his seller."' 10 There has
been strong sentiment among some commercial lawyers to excise this
feature from section 9-307(1), making it apply against all security interests."1 The amendment might add Article 2 possessory security interests to the list of Tanbro's casualties. Absent that amendment,
however, Tanbro does not upset the Code's construct for Article 2 security interests," 2 notwithstanding the fact that Tanbro permits a buyer
to claim ordinary course status when his seller is not in possession.
Article 2 also creates a security interest in favor of buyers who
That Article 2 serightfully reject or revoke acceptance of goods.'
curity interest, which extends only to goods in the disappointed buyer's
possession or control, should withstand attack by buyers in ordinary
course from the breaching seller. Such buyers may not avail themselves of the protection of section 9-307(1) against this nonconsensual
security interest arising by operation of law.
D.

PossessoryLiens

Courts and legislatures have long recognized the significance of
possession for artisans or mechanics who enhance the value of goods.
Both the common law" 4 and statutes' ' protect the lien on personal
property of certain creditors who maintain possession of that property.
In the event those creditors surrender possession of the goods, however,
they generally lose the lien." 6 The Code recognizes this kind of lien
and the significance of corresponding possession. It sanctions the pri110. Emphasis supplied. See, eg., National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d
484 (1967).
111. See Knapp, Protectingthe Buyer of PreviOusly Encumbered Goods:Another Pleafor Revision of UCC Section 9-307(1), 15 ARiz. L. REV. 861 (1973). The text assumes that Article 9
governs Article 2 security interests except as specifically exempted from Article 9 by § 9-113.
Accord, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 781 (1972). Contra, Kreindler, supra note 9, at 87.
112. U.C.C. § 2-505, Comment 4 supports the conclusion of the text. By stating that a subbuyer in ordinary course will defeat the seller who does not reserve a security interest, the Comment implies that such a sub-buyer will not defeat a seller who does reserve one.
113. Id. § 2-711(3).
114. The classic instance of a common-law possessory lien is that of the unpaid seller in possession. See, e.g., McEwan v. Smith, 9 Eng. Rep. 1109, 1117 (H.L. 1849). See generally 3 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 76, § 507a.
115. See, eg., UNIFORM SALES ACT § 54. Significantly, those statutes not requiring possession employ a notice-filing scheme. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 570.1 (1970).
116. See, eg., U.C.C. § 7-209(4).
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ority of the lien over earlier perfected security interests.' 17 While
Tanbro suggests that a buyer of goods subject to such a possessory lien
may satisfy buyer in ordinary course requisites, nothing in section 9307(1) suggests that such a buyer defeats the possessory lien, which is
not a security interest.18
E.

Entrustment

Commercial lawyers have also recognized the unfairness of permitting a true owner to clothe another with the appearance of ownership and then deny the implications of that appearance. Manifest in a
number of separate rules, this recognition has roots in estoppel and
agency doctrines and 9results directly from the notion that possession
connotes ownership.
The development of this rule has been somewhat tortuous. Originally, the true owner lost to a buyer only if the owner permitted the
entrustee to mislead the buyer. Possession alone was insufficient, but
possession with a bill of sale'2 0 or with the entrustee's name emblazoned on the goods 12 sufficed. Gradually, commercial lawyers came
to accept the view of Lord Ellenborough in Pickeringv. Busk,"I that an
entrustor who delivers goods to a merchant dealer in those goods will
not be heard to say he delivered them without authority to sell. 2 3 Section 2-403(2) codifies this rule.
It is customary to justify the rule in terms of fault. Both true owner and buyer are innocent of wrongdoing, the merchant being the culprit. Yet either the true owner or the buyer must suffer loss of the
Courts rise to the
goods, with the merchant's fisc as his only resort."2
occasion with relish and announce that the true owner, having put his
trust in the wrongdoer, should bear the loss. 2 5
117. Id. § 9-310. The priority, however, will not arise if the rule of law or statute creating the
lien provides otherwise. Id.
118. See id. § 9-310 & Comment; c.id. § 7-209 (treating a warehouse lien and a warehouse
security interest differently).
119. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1057-60; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8,
Comment a (1957).
120. Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.H. 34, 37 (1876).
121. O'Connor's Adm'x v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318, 321, 32 A. 1029, 1030 (1895). See generally 2 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 76, § 316.
122. 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (K.B. 1812).
123. Id. at 760-61.
124. In the event the true owner suffers the loss of the goods, he has a cause of action against
the merchant sounding in tort, conversion. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 15, at 87-89 (4th ed. 1971). In the event the buyer suffers the loss, he has a cause of action
against the merchant for breach of warranty of title. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1).
125. See O'Connor's Adm'x v. Clark, 170 Pa. at 321, 32 A. at 1030 (1895); Sf. Miller v. Race,
97 Eng. Rep. 398, 400 (K.B. 1758) (involving commercial paper where the successful plaintiff's
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Some have objected to this analysis on the grounds that both buyer
and true owner trusted the merchant and that the rule is essentially one
of allocating loss in a fashion that facilitates commerce. 126 Yet the
traditional explanation merits more credit than its critics are willing to
give it. The rule is eminently sensible. It allocates loss in a manner
that forces true owners to select merchants carefully and frees buyers
from title inquiry. The rule thus acknowledges the fact that it is easier
and less costly for an entrustor to select and control his merchant than
it is for a buyer to do so. Most often, buyers deal with more
merchants, true owners with fewer; and buyers generally deal with their
merchant sellers on an infrequent or casual basis, the true owner enjoying a more permanent relationship with his merchants. The rule
serves the realities of the usual setting and comports with what reasonable parties expect. The courts have correctly concluded that a true
owner who selects a dishonest merchant bears more blame than a buyer
who selects one.
More important for the purposes of this discussion is the role that
reasonable expectations play in fashioning or justifying commercial
precepts. Absent other compelling considerations, 27 these expectations should determine the rules of commercial law, and the entrustment rule respects expectations based on possession.'2 8
F

Factors

It was a principle of early commercial law that a factor could convey title to a good faith purchaser even though the factor acted beyond
the scope of his actual authority. 29 Brokers, however, could not pass
30
better title than they themselves enjoyed or had power to convey.'
The reason for the disparate treatment stemmed in part from possession: the factor had it, the broker did not.13 1 More importantly, buyers
attorney argued that the true owner, who was robbed of his bank note, "was guilty of some laches

in not preventing it.").
126. See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 177-78 (2d ed. 1959).
127. Such compelling considerations are infrequent. Illegality, which sometimes comes as a
surprise to the parties but nonetheless renders their contract disabled, is one example. Thus it is
no criticism of the general commercial principle that an unlawful pact is void to say that the
parties reasonably expected it to be enforceable. See text accompanying notes 200-11 infra.
128. Professor Gilmore observes that the good faith purchaser "is protected not because of his
praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without
elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who
offers it for sale or to secure a loan." Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1057.
129. See James v. Meriwether Graham Oliver Co., 152 Tenn. 528, 279 S.W. 390 (1925).
130. The text assumes a distinction between brokers and factors that commercial practice and
courts did not always observe. Compare Pickering v. Busk, 104 Eng. Rep. 758, 760 (K.B. 1812),
with F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AGENCY § 24, at 64 (2d ed. 1924).
131. The agent who held the goods or a warehouse receipt covering them, however, could
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reasonably expected that factors had authority to sell but could not reasonably believe the same of brokers. By framing its rule in terms of
"entrustment,"' 132 the Article 2 buyer in ordinary course rule, section 2403(2), embodies this presumption. Tanbro therefore does nothing to
alter this aspect of the good faith purchase doctrine, which the provision of section 2-403(2) expressly controls.
G

Voidable Title

Another, less precise manifestation of commercial law deference to
apparent ownership is the doctrine of voidable title codified in section
2-403(1). At common law certain fraudulent conduct on the part of a

buyer from the true owner gave the true owner of goods the right to
void the transaction and recover delivered goods. 133 Prior to recovery
the fraudulent party enjoys possession, and the situation is likely to
mislead the good faith buyer. The voidable title doctrine stipulates
that in the event the common law vests the malefactor with voidable
title, he can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
While courts often justify the voidable title doctrine by reference to the
culpability rationale used in the entrustment cases, 134 the rule's appeal 135 stems from its recognition that possession induces reliance and
that true owners'are usually in a better position to investigate the credit
and integrity of their buyers than buyers are to investigate the title apparently held by their sellers. 136 The doctrine of voidable title
convey good title. See Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S.
520, 525 (1916).
132. "'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession
U.C.C.
.
§ 2-403(3).
133. See California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1933); Stanton
Motor Corp. v. Rosetti, 11 App. Div. 2d 296, 298, 203 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (1960). The Code
abolishes that right to recover in credit sales except in cases where the buyer receives goods while
insolvent. U.C.C. § 2-702(2). Noneffieless, the doctrine of voidable title survives largely intact.
Id. § 2-403(l). In cash, as opposed to credit sales, moreover, the Code gives the seller the right to
recover goods when the buyer's cash equivalent turns out to be a rubber check. Id. § 2-507. See
Lawrence v. Graham, 29 Md. App. 422, 427, 349 A.2d 271, 274 (1975); cf. Twyne's Case, 76 Eng.
Rep. 809, 820 (S.C. 1601) (interpreting statute to protect certain purchasers and certain creditors
against fraudulent conveyances).
134. See White v. Garden, 138 Eng. Rep. 364, 367 (C.P. 1851): "One of two innocent parties
must suffer: and surely it is more just that the burthen should fall on the defendants, who were
guilty of negligence in parting with their goods upon the faith of a piece of paper which a little
inquiry would have shewn to be worthless, rather than upon the plaintiff, who trusted to the
possession of the goods themselves."
135. Arguably the rule, because of its imprecision, has no appeal. See Warren, Cutting Off
Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 475 (1963).
Yet that imprecision stems not from the policy of protecting buyers against true owners but from
the difficulty of determining when the common law clothes the malefactor with voidable title.
136. This assumption, though difficult to substantiate by data, underscores much of commercial law. It stems in part from the assumption that most buyers are small and most sellers big.
See Kripke, The PrinciplesUnderlyingthe Draftingofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL.
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manifests again the law's concern that possession not mislead. 37 Section 2-403(1) insulates this aspect of the Code scheme from Tanbro.
H. Seller's Lien
Analogous to the Article 2 security interest and the artisan's possessory lien is the seller's lien'3 8 provision of section 2-507(2). That
subsection protects the cash seller against the buyer, stipulating that the
buyer has no right to possession of the goods unless he pays for them.
Courts have construed section 2-507(2), along with section 2-511, as
permitting the seller to recover possession when he has delivered goods
against a check that is later dishonored.' 39 Significantly, section 2-

507(2) does not contain any provision extending or denying extension
of the seller's right as against subsequent purchasers. 14
L.F. 321, 323-26. Significantly, although White v. Garden, 138 Eng. Rep. 364, 368 (C.P. 1851),
contains language supporting the culpability rationale, it also contains reasoning that is economic
in slant. The true owners argued that they should be able to recover the goods they had sold to
the fraudulent party. Chief Justice Jervis considered that argument "most inconvenient." Similarly, the most liberal entrustment case, Pickering v. Busk, 104 Eng. Rep. 758, 760 (K.B. 1812),
uses economic as opposed to moral suasion. "Strangers can only look to the acts of the parties,
and to the external indicia of property, and not to the private communications which may pass
between a principal and his broker .. " Id. at 760. For a more recent entrustment case with a
similar mixture of culpability reasoning and economic rationale, see Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Bldg. & Loan Co., 52 Ohio App. 2d 399, 402, 370 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1977).
137. Significantly, the common law did not consider the malefactor to have possession in the
legal sense. Professor Maitland observes that his butler did not "possess" the family plate; but if
the butler fraudulently sold to a silversmith, the silversmith did have "possession." Maitland,
supra note 24, at 488. Evidently law professors were rather better off in those days. This Article
does not make Professor Maitland's distinction between "legal possession" and possession in the
usual sense. See note 4 supra.
138. So long as the seller retains possession of the goods, it does little harm to refer to his
rights in the goods as a "lien." That terminology proves troublesome, however, in the bankruptcy
context when the seller has parted with possession. Professor Kennedy implies that the term
"interest" serves commercial lawyers better. Kennedy, The Interest ofa Reclaiming Seller Under
Article 2 ofthe Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 1833 (1975). See also In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th
Cir. 1977); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.), 524 F.2d 761 (9th
Cir. 1975); Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REv. 435 (1971).
139. In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Mort Co., 208 F.
Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 32 Colo.
App. 235, 239, 511 P.2d 912, 913 (1973); Lawrence v. Graham, 29 Md. App. 422, 426, 349 A.2d
271, 273 (1975).
140. Section 2-702, however, which gives the seller certain reclamation rights after delivery in
a credit sale situation, does contain such a provision. U.C.C. § 2-702(3). The credit sale section
also contains a ten day limit on the time within which the seller must demand recovery of possession. Id. § 2-702(2). Most courts, with the encouragement of Comment 3, have read the ten day
rule into § 2-507. See, e.g., In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 96, 107 (S.D. Iowa 1973);
Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169 (rex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). Some courts, moreover, and a strong suggestion in the
comments, would incorporate all of the limitations of§ 2-702(3) into § 2-507(2). See U.C.C. § 2507, Comment 3 (third sentence); Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1244
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). Significantly, all of the cases cited in this footnote
involve delivery from seller to buyer and therefore are consistent with the result that the thesis
advanced in this Article would yield. They are inconsistent only to the extent that any court
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If S enters into a contract of sale with B, and B refuses payment,

section 2-507(2) permits S to withhold the goods from B. Similarly, if
S delivers against B's check which later turns out to be worthless, section 2-507(2) permits S to recover possession from B, even though S
has delivered. Assume, however, that before S recovers the goods, B
enters into a contract of sale with a third party or that B has granted a
security interest in after-acquired property to a bank. Because section
2-507(2) does not speak to these possibilities, their resolution must rest
on the basic pattern of Code conveyancing rules. That pattern begins

with security of property: B cannot give to his takers what he does not
have. Even if S has delivered, B does not hold the goods free of S's

right to recover them, and under strict security of property principles
B's buyer and the bank take subject to that right.

Security of property, however, is only the starting point. B's
buyer and the bank may attempt to rely on the good faith purchase
rules"n ' of sections 2-403(2) and 2-403(1). Under the former, if B is a
merchant dealer in goods of the kind S sold and B's buyer is a buyer in
ordinary course, B's buyer defeats S who entrusted to B. Under the
latter, if the law of the jurisdiction confers voidable title on B under
either B's buyer 143 or the bank' 44
traditional voidable title theory, 42 45
prevails as a good faith purchaser. 1

would extend them to sub-purchasers in good faith when the seller, as in Tanbro, never delivered
the goods.
141. U.C.C. Section 2-507(2), Comment 3 supports this view. Section 2-507(2) speaks of the
buyer's rights "as against the seller." Comment 3 notes that these terms are used "as words of
limitation to conform with the policy set forth in the bona fide purchase sections" of Article 2. Cf.
Id.§ 2-505, Comment 4 (second sentence) (explicitly approving the use of good faith purchase
rules to defeat an Article 2 security interest).
142. Parker v. Patrick, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1793).
143. See Gardiner Mfg. Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Fairfield
Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 96, 106 (S.D. Iowa 1973); c. Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction
Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (sub-purchaser did not defeat right of
reclamation because he knew of the right and, therefore, did not satisfy the good faith purchase
standard); accord,In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 436,442 (N.D. Ga. 1974)
(credit-sale case). See also Dugan, Cash-SaleSellers UnderArticles 2 and 9 of the Unform Commercial Code, 8 COM. L.J. 330, 352-63 (1975).
144. A lender who takes a security interest is a "purchaser." See U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33);
Evans Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 421 P.2d 979 (1966).
145. Accord, Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied,429 U.S. 834 (1976); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.
1974); Vf Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 32 Colo. App. 235, 240, 511
P.2d 912, 914 (1973) (§ 9-301 lists those parties who defeat an unperfected security interest and
does not include the seller with a right to reclaim; therefore, the unperfected secured party
prevails). That holding leads to unacceptable results. For example, if a thief steals goods and
grants a security interest in them, no one would suggest that the secured party defeats the true
owner, even though the true owner is not listed in § 9-301 as defeating the secured party. It is
more appropriate to read § 9-301 as applying only to rights of parties arising after the secured
party takes his unperfected security interest. See also note 22 supra.
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Tanbro suggests that even if S did not deliver the goods to B, B's
buyer may rise to the status of a buyer in ordinary course. Even with
that status, however, he will not defeat S because none of the buyer in
ordinary course provisions help him. He does not benefit from section
2-403(2) because there is no entrustment. He does not qualify under
section 7-205, because he did not take delivery. Section 9-307(1) does
not benefit him because it protects only against a security interest created by B. 146 These conclusions find further support in section 2-703,
which gives sellers the right to "cancel" the contract and withhold delivery in the event of the buyer's breach. Nothing in that section suggests that these rights are subject to the interests of third parties. If
delivery has not occurred, there is no need to give third parties rights.
Analysis of the seller's very limited right to recover goods after
delivery in credit-sale situations yields similar conclusions. In credit
sales, the operative provision, section 2-702, explicitly refers to the good
faith purchase rules of section 2-403.147 The credit seller's right to reclaim, furthermore, fits the security interest mold no better than the
cash seller's right to reclaim after delivery. 48 Being nonpossessory,
the interest, if a security interest, would be unperfected and thus lose to
most good faith purchasers under either section 2-403 or section 9301(l)(c).
This view of the seller's lien illustrates traditional application of
possession rules. If the cash seller surrenders possession in return for a
cash equivalent that turns out to be worthless, he loses to good faith
purchasers under section 2-403. Those sub-purchasers may have relied
on the first buyer's possession. If a cash seller retains possession, however, and does not deliver the goods, he defeats good faith purchasers.
Purchasers could not have relied on the first buyer's possession.
Those who consider the seller's right to the goods under section 2507(2) a security interest implicitly reject this analysis, but they do not
argue for a resulting situation to which Tanbro applies. If the seller's
146. The right to reclaim may not be a security interest at all. But see Kennedy, supra note
138. The notion of characterizing the seller's rights under § 2-507(2) as a security interest places
limits on those rights. Section 9-113, Comment 3 takes the position that any Article 2 security
interest is subject to the attachment, perfection, and priority rules of Article 9 once the goods are
delivered to the buyer. The leading case, In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960), tacitly rejects
that view in favor of a seller's right to reclaim in a credit sale situation. See also In re Federal's,
Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 511 (6th Cir. 1977); cf In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir.
1968) (explicitly rejecting the argument that the seller's right to reclaim under § 2-702 is a security
interest). Contra, Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d at 1246 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Peerless Equip. Co. v. Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977 no writ); Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 926-28.
147. U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
148. See note 150 infra.
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right is a security interest, prior to delivery it is perfected by possession
and buyers in ordinary course will not prevail over that interest under
Tanbro. Such a security interest is not created by "his seller" as section 9-307(1) requires. The buyer who takes delivery, however, would
defeat the unperfected seller. Section 9-301(l)(c) governs. In short,
Tanbro should not disturb the seller's rights under section 2-507(2).
In a recent article Professors Jackson and Peters 149 take the position that the seller's right to reclaim goods, whether it arises under section 2-507(2) (the bad check situation) or section 2-702(2) (the insolvent
buyer situation), is an Article 2 security interest. 15 0 Significantly, they
would accord perfected status to the right of reclamation even though
the seller has delivered the goods to the buyer.'5 1 That view differs

from the position of this Article in two important respects. First, it
deemphasizes the role of possession. Authorities generally agree that
the seller's interest recognized by sections 2-505 and 2-711(3) is an Article 2 security interest and is exclusively possessory.' 52 Even though the
seller has delivered the goods to a third party, e.g., a common carrier,
he controls the conduct of that party by virtue of his power to stop
goods in transit 5 and prevent delivery to the buyer unless the buyer
pays. 54 The possessory nature of this security interest justifies the
general rule of Article 9 that the integrity of Article 2 security interests
does not depend upon the existence of a security agreement or the filing
Characterizing the seller's right to reclaim
of a financing statement.'
as a security interest, however, leads to the conclusion, accepted by
149. Professor Peters, since the publication of the article, accepted an appointment to the
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
150. Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 926. Section 1-201(37) defines a security interest to
include "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." Clearly there is some conceptual difficulty with the conclusion that a right to reclaim
goods, which arises upon events unknown to the seller at the time of delivery, is an interest to
secure payment or performance. The interest of a seller which permits him to reclaim delivered
goods more closely resembles a right to cancel-a right to avoid performance, not secure it. See
Braucher, Reclamation of Good from a FraudulentBuyer, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1967).
Professor Kennedy is willing to include the seller's right to reclaim within the security interest
definition but nonetheless rejects the notion that the right should be subject to Article 9 priority
rules. He confines Article 9 rules to consensual security interests. See Kennedy, su.pra note 138.
See also Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41, 49 (1975).
151. Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 926.
152. See Kennedy, supra note 138.
153. U.C.C. § 2-705.
154. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra. Note also that the § 2-711(3) security interest
arises only if the aggrieved buyer is in possession or control of the goods.
155. U.C.C. § 9-113. Section 9-113 treats the Article 2 security interest in a fashion closely
analogous to Article 9 treatment of pledges by modifying the general requirement for a security
agreement and eliminating the general requirement of a filed financing statement. See id. §§ 9203(l)(a), -305. This parallel may serve as further support for the view that § 9-113 expects
Article 2 security interests to be possessory as pledges are.
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Professors Jackson and Peters, that a seller has a valid security interest
56
without possession and without a filing, ie., a valid, secret lien.1
Second, holding that the seller's right to reclaim is a security inter-

est forces resolution of disputes among purchasers into the priority
rules of Article 9,157 and conflicts with the general thesis of this Article

that Article 2 conveyancing rules, beginning with the security of property principle and including specific good faith purchase rules, should
govern these disputes. The language of Article 9 does not always mesh
well with a seller's nonconsensual right to reclaim; Professors Jackson
and Peters resolve these problems through complex, resourceful, and

lengthy analysis accompanied by a modicum of violence to Code language.' 58 The simpler approach suggested here may well be preferable. The two theories, moreover, have different results in some
instances. t59
156. Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 939. If the right to reclaim is a security interest, it
must be perfected. Any other conclusion would yield unacceptable results, such as a rule that the
seller's right to reclaim is subordinate to the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy-a rule which most
courts and commercial lawyers agree is contrary to the intention of Article 2. Id Butsee Dugan,
supra note 143, at 364-71. This view, that the seller's interest is perfected notwithstanding the
seller's delivery, depends upon the language of § 9-113, which excuses Article 2 security interests
from the security agreement and filing requirements of Article 9 "so long as the debtor does not
have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods." Clearly, a buyer who snatches the
goods and then locks himself in his house and refuses to pay has not lawfully obtained possession,
and pre-Code authority suggests that it is against just such conduct that § 9-113 guards. See
Burns Bros. v. Bigelow, 122 N.Y.S. 253, 255 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1910); 1 REPORT OF THE [N.Y.] L.
REV'N COMM'N FOR 1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 482. The Jackson-Peters position, arguably borne out by the language of § 9-113, extends Article 2 perfected security
interest status to nearly all situations governed by §§ 2-507(2) and 2-703(2), needlessly expanding
the possibility of a secret lien. Rejection of security interest status for the seller's right to reclaim
obviates that expansion. As this Article demonstrates, the right to reclaim viewed solely as a
right, rather than a security interest, will defeat the trustee in bankruptcy. See note 22 supra.
This Article's approach, moreover, relieves the pressure to expand the scope of the "not lawfully
obtain possession" language of § 9-113 beyond the snatch-and-lock situation and thus limits the
scope of the secret lien. Secret liens are not always commercially baleful. See note 159 infra.
Here, however, reliance creditors might be trapped by the seller's secret right to recover.
157. U.C.C. § 9-113 does not relieve Article 2 security interests from the priority regulations of
Article 9.
158. For example, the priority rule of§ 9-301(l)(c), which designates those persons who defeat
unperfected security interests, speaks of a "transferee" or a "buyer," neither of which categories
fits the reclaiming seller.
159. There are two important instances. First, the analysis of Professors Jackson and Peters
favors the seller's right of reclamation over the unperfected secured party. See Jackson & Peters,
supra note 22, at 972. The theory of this Article could yield a contrary result. Under security of
property rules, a buyer cannot grant more to his unperfected secured lender than the buyer himself enjoys. The buyer holds goods subject to the seller's right to reclaim; and it is, therefore, in
goods subject to that right that the secured party obtains a security interest. Yet security of property is only the starting point; the inquiry follows with a search for good faith purchase rules that
modify the general principle. The secured party, whether perfected or unperfected, is a purchaser, § 1-201(31), -201(32), and § 2-403(1) protect the good faith purchaser in the event the
buyer has voidable title, as this buyer would under most voidable title cases and in the event the
secured party has taken delivery at some point. See text accompanying note 133 supra. Professors Jackson and Peters rightly note that this Article's view may protect a secret lien--that of a
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FraudulentRetention

It would be a mistake, however, to read the entrustment and voidable title rules as part of a common-law tradition favoring protection of
buyers against secured parties at all costs. As the fraudulent retention
rule of section 2-402 demonstrates, the rules are part of a fabric

designed to satisfy the reasonable expectations of all parties.
Under the fraudulent retention rule, a buyer who leaves his seller
in possession exposes himself to the claim by the seller's creditors that
the seller's possession misled them. Possession of the goods by the
seller leads creditors to believe the seller is worthy of credit. Some
common-law courts responded to this reasonable reliance by character-

izing the retention of sold goods as fraudulent16 ° and by ruling against

the buyer. 161 In section 2-402(2), the Code recognizes the rule of those

cases. 162
J. Bulk Sales
Bulk sales statutes express a similar desire to protect creditors
against being misled. Adopted by many states, 163 these statutes required that creditors of a business be notified of an impending bulk
sale of inventory. " Failure to give notice renders the sale ineffective
against the creditors. 165 Article 6 of the Code makes these rules uniform and is another instance of the recognition that possession of goods
may induce reliance by creditors as well as buyers.
secured party who fails to perfect or who loses his perfection. The protection applies, however,
only in favor of a goodfaith secured party, and it applies against a seller who is not a reliance
creditor. The seller's right to reclaim arises not in situations where the seller is relying on the
buyer's possession or on the lack of filings. The right arises when the seller relies either on a
check which proves worthless or on the solvency of a buyer who is insolvent. The secret nature of
the unperfected secured party's interest, then, does not offend the sensibilities which secret liens
normally offend-reasonable reliance on appearances. Second, the Jackson-Peters article also
seems to favor the seller's right to reclaim over perfected secured parties. Jackson & Peters, supra
note 22, at 969. That result also conflicts with the result the thesis of this Article would yield.
See text accompanying notes 138-45 supra. Cf In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 436, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (holding that a secured party never defeats the right to reclaim
under § 2-702).
160. See, e.g., Sturtevant v. Ballard, 6 Am. Dec. 281, 285 (N.Y. 1812).
161. Not all jurisdictions accepted the common-law rule, however. Many of them enacted
statutes that modified it. See generally 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 76, § 353; 1 G. GLENN, supra
note 55, § 354.
162. The Code softens the impact of the rule somewhat by excepting from its operation the
"possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially
reasonable time after a sale or identification .... " U.C.C. § 2-402(2).
163. W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 163 (1958).
164. See, eg., N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 44 (repealed 1964).
165. Lowendahl v. Van Bokkelen, Inc., 139 Misc. 857, 858, 248 N.Y.S. 553, 554, af/'d, 234
App. Div. 749, 254 N.Y.S. 917 (1931), a/7'd, 260 N.Y. 557 (1932).
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In both bulk sale and fraudulent retention situations courts and
legislatures place the burden on the buyer, not the creditor. This allocation is justified by the same kind of analysis that justifies the opposite
result in the entrustment and voidable title cases. Since buyers with
relatively modest expense and diligence can prevent creditor reliance in
the fraudulent retention and bulk sale situations, buyers bear the cost.
Since creditors can prevent buyer reliance in the voidable title and entrustment situations more easily than buyers can inquire into title, creditors bear the losses in those cases. Arguably, the rules in these buyer
versus creditor disputes turn not on pro-buyer or pro-creditor bias of
the Code but on the principle of keeping costs low.
K.

Consignments

The law of consignment provides additional support for these conclusions. Consignment, a special kind of entrustment, leaves title to
goods in the true owner while permitting the merchant to take possession. This private allocation of the incidents of title between two parties bodes ill for both purchasers and creditors of the merchant. First,
if the true owner can deny the merchant's authority to sell, buyers will
be misled by the merchant's possession. Second, if the true owner can
deny the merchant's title, creditors will be similarly misled. While
there is no evidence that true owners have had the temerity to argue
for, or that any courts would accept, the first of these commercial outrages,1 66 there is authority for the second. 167 Some courts accepted the
metaphysical distinction between one who sells goods and retains a security interest-the pre-Code conditional seller and chattel mortgagee-and the consignor, who does not sell but retains title and merely
surrenders possession. Other courts avoided the unfortunate effect of
the arrangement by looking through it to find a disguised conditional
sale, a chattel mortgage, or a modification of the consignment prerequisite.' 68 The latter trend in the case law rendered consignments sufficiently problematical that true owners frequently refused to accept the
risk of failure to comply with the filing requirements of the conditional
sales statutes169 and chattel mortgage statutes,170 which entailed loss of
title to the merchant's creditor. Adoption of the Code ended this experiment in misleading creditors. Section 2-326 expressly provides
166. The Code interdicts any such position today by virtue of § 2-403(2).
167. See, ag., Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522, 528 (1913). See generally
Hawkland, Consignment Selling under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.. 146 (1962).
168. See cases cited in Hawkland, supra note 167, at 147 n.6, 7, & 8.
169. See, eg., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 5.
170. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2957 (West 1935) (repealed 1965).
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that such consignments are good against the merchant's creditor
only if
171
facts demonstrate that no reasonable creditor will be misled.
L.

Secret Liens

Few commercial practices have earned the universal opprobrium
courts and legislatures have heaped on the secret lien. Secret liens, Le.,
interests reflected by neither possession nor notice, amounted to fraud
at common law and were unenforceable. 7 ' It is far less costly for a

creditor out of possession to make his lien public than it is for third
parties to ferret out surreptitious conveyances. Legislatures strictly re-

quired notice filing in the plethora of pre-Code statutes that authorized

174
Oppononpossessory security interests.17 3 The Code follows suit.

171. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) subjects consigned goods to the claims of the merchant's creditors unless the consignor:
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the like to be
evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article
9).
Consumer transactions expose the weakness of this rule. In Founders Inv. Corp. v. Fegett, S.W.2d - (Ky. 1978), for example, a consumer who suffered from dyslexia and whose wife was ill
felt he could not afford the payments on his mobile home. He returned the home to the retailer,
and asked the retailer to solicit orders. The retailer's bank argued that the arrangement was a
consignment and that the bank could make a claim on the mobile home, since the consumer had
not complied with § 2-326. The court rejected the bank's argument with the rejoinder that it
would be "unfair" to apply the consignment rule to this consignor. - S.W.2d at -. There is no
explicit Code support for the court's position. The consignment section, however, is a good faith
purchase rule. The doctrine of good faith purchase is commercial in nature. See generally Gilmore, supra note 7; Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L. REV. 725 (1939); Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REV. 873 (1939). When consumers own
valuable nontitled assets like mobile homes, their entry into commerce becomes significant. The
Fegett court refused to apply a commercial doctrine in favor of a bank and against a good faith
consumer who could not read or write. Striking the balance in similar cases will not be easy, but
the Fegett court might have made more of the fact that the good faith purchase doctrine does not
mesh well with the reasonable expectations of consumers. Cf. 1 REPORT OF THE [N.Y.] LAW
REv'N COMM'N FOR 1954, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 108 (Professor Llewellyn on certain merchant rules: "[A]ll of these rest on the vital need for distinguishing merchants
from housewives. ... ).
172. See, e.g., Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 N.Y. 581, 589 (1851); cf. Paget v. Perchard, 170 Eng.
Rep. 329, 330 (K.B. 1794) (a lien creditor case).
173. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 5; UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 7;
California Chattel Mortgage Statute, CAL. CiV. CODE § 2957 (West 1935) (repealed 1965).
174. See U.C.C. § 9-302. The broadest exception to the Code's general possession-or-filing
requirement applies to consumer goods. See id. § 9-302(l)(d). That exception stems from the
notion that these rules of purchase apply in the commercial context but not elsewhere. Professor
Gilmore is adamant on that point and takes pains to distinguish noncommercial cases. See
generally Gilmore, supra note 7. The exception for purchase money security interests in consumer goods does not imply that any transaction involving consumers is noncommercial. On the
contrary, sales out of inventory are commercial and the purchase rules apply to them. Yet the
sales of consumer goods to which § 9-302(l)(d) is applicable, are inherently noncommercial. See
U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
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nents of the secret lien found a willing champion in Justice Brandeis,
who attempted to lay
this ghostly interest to rest once and for all in
175
Benedict v. Ratner.
Benedict held that even though possession of accounts cannot be
transferred physically-there being nothing to transfer-and even
though the transferor cannot maintain possession, permitting a debtor
to use proceeds from the sale of collateral is so antithetical to the concept of conveyance that the practice amounted to fraud. The Benedict
rule quickly found application in revolving inventory financing 176 and
was one of the impediments to the floating lien. The Code properly
17 7
rejects it.
Benedict concluded that a creditor, who left his debtor in possession and who took insufficient steps to ensure that the debtor paid proceeds of sales to the creditor, should not stand higher than innocent
third parties.17 8 It was not a question of ostensible ownership, the
court held, but of permitting the lien to shift from one batch of accounts to a later batch of accounts. In Benedict the Court seemed
moved by a subjective evaluation of the good faith or moral conduct of
the creditor and third parties. The Court failed, however, to reckon
the cost of the alternative it commanded; by requiring the creditor to
17 9
police the collateral, it seriously hampered working capital loans.
The result for creditors, debtors, and ultimately buyers was waste.180
By comparison, the cost to third parties of checking for filings is low.'8 1
Admittedly, third parties who find filings have no way of policing the
debtor's conduct, but they can evaluate the risk. Post-Code experience
and the general success of floating inventory and accounts receivable
loans suggest that third parties will take the risk without significant
consequences.

175. 268 U.S. 353, 364 (1925).
176. See, eg., Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1926). In fact Justice Brandeis made it
clear that the Benedict rule should apply "whatever the nature of the property transferred.' Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 364 (1925).
177. See U.C.C. § 9-205, Comments 1 & 2.
178. In Benedict, the innocent third party was the apollyon of commercial law, the trustee in

bankruptcy.
179. "To require a dealer to apply all of the proceeds of sales to liquidate the loan may be the
same as asking him to retire from business." Skilton, The Factor'sLien on Merchandise (pt. 1),
1955 Wis. L. REv.356, 362.
180. Id.; Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 76.
181. In New York at the time of the Benedict case, no filing was necessary to perfect the
assignment of accounts. The case does not turn on that point, however, and would have applied
regardless of filing. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363-64 (1925). See also Brown v. Leo,
12 F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1926).
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The lesson of Benedict is analogous to much of the experience of
good faith purchase doctrine. Commercial lawyers must overcome the
initially tempting route of resolving these conflicts by resort to notions
of innocence versus culpability. From a subjective standpoint, an innocent buyer in bulk who takes subject to a filed security interest 182 is
no more or less culpable than the innocent buyer in bulk who takes free
of an unperfected security interest. Nor is the creditor who files purer
from a subjective standpoint than the mistaken creditor who does not
file. Commercial law, however, can seldom afford the luxury of subjective inquiry. It must resort to objective standards of conduct, standards determined by conduct that is reasonable in the marketplace and
the banking house.
M

PurchaseMoney Priority

The purchase money priority rule of section 9-312 governs priority
disputes between a purchase money lender and a revolving lender.
Assume that on January 1 Mill had borrowed working capital from a
bank and granted the bank a security interest in all its after-acquired
inventory and equipment. Assume as well that on May 1 Deering entered into a contract with Mill to sell fabric and retained a security
interest for the purchase price, perfected by possession. There are priority problems concerning the fabric and the proceeds when Mill sells
the fabric.
Generally, when two secured parties claim an interest in the same
collateral, the party who files or perfects first prevails.'8 3 In this hypothetical the bank filed first and would prevail under that general
rule.184 Since Deering's interest is a purchase money security interest,18 5 however, the general rule gives way to the special priority rules
of section 9-312(3) and (4). The first relates to inventory, the second to
equipment. Inventory consists of goods "held by a person who holds

182. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c).

183. Id. § 9-312(5)(a). This rule is a curious mix of security of property principles and good
faith purchase doctrine. Under the rule, A may prevail over B, even though B perfects first. A
may file first and become perfected after B. ld.§§ 9-203(2), -303(1). Cautious lenders often
pursue just such a practice. Yet if A prevails, even though his perfected security interest arises
after B's, then the rule clearly departs from security of property principles in favor of a notice
scheme. On the other hand, ifrA and B both perfect without filing, the first to perfect prevails-a

result more consistent with security of property.
184. The hypothetical reflects careful lending practice. A lender traditionally will file first
and check to see that its filing enjoys priority before it disburses loan proceeds. The priority rule
of§ 9-312(5)(a) follows that-tradition by granting the lender priority as of the date of filing, even
though his security interest attaches later when he disburses the loan. See id. § 9-203(2).
185. See id. § 9-107(a).
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them for sale."' 186 Equipment consists of goods "used or bought for
use primarily in business" and includes goods that do not fall into the
categories of inventory, farm products, or consumer goods. 187 Two
questions arise concerning the Tanbro fabric. The first is whether the
fabric is Mill's inventory or equipment. Clearly it is neither farm
products nor consumer goods. 88 Traditional notions of inventory and
equipment favor the inventory characterization. Mill does not "hold"
the fabric unless for purposes of the definition courts would construe
Deering's physical possession as Mill's control. That view should not
shock anyone and would better serve reasonable expectations than the
view that the fabric is equipment. The second question is whether, if
the fabric is inventory, the purchase money seller 189 must notify Mill's
bank. Neither the letter nor the spirit of section 9-312(3) requires notice. The subsection specifies that the purchase money lender must
give notice before he files a financing statement1 90 and not more than
five years before the debtor receives possession. 19 1 In this hypothetical
situation, however, Deering never files a financing statement but perfects by possession instead. Mill, moreover, never takes possession,
unless the conclusion that Mill "holds" the fabric dictates the conclusion that Mill "possesses" it.
There is a certain appeal to this conclusion, yet such literal treatment conflicts with basic Code policy and the common-law tradition of
disregarding "a statutory limitation where the reason of the limitation
did not apply."'192 The reason for the notice requirement in section 9312(3) is to warn the revolving inventory lender (the bank in this example) that dilution of its collateral is imminent. 193 Warning serves two
purposes. First, it prevents such a lender from being misled. Absent
notice, high inventory levels might lull the lender into a false sense of
security, and the lender would then fail to realize that another secured
party may claim priority. The comment indicates that the drafters
fashioned the notice provision in order to avoid that false sense of security. The notice serves a second purpose. Some lenders are understandably wary of sharing collateral with anyone and insist that theirs
be the only security interest. In the event of default the lender may
186. Id. § 9-109(4) (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 9-109(2). See also id § 9-109, Comment 5 (third sentence).

188. See id. § 9-109(l) & (3).
189. Although the hypothetical involves a purchase money seller, the analysis would be no
different if the purchase money party were a lender. See id § 9-107.
190. Id. § 9-312(3)(b).
191. Id. § 9-312(3)(c).
192. Id. § 1-102, Comment 1.
193. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 38, § 29.3.
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want to sell the collateral in bulk. He certainly does not want to contend with another secured party over terms of the sale or the extent to
which collateral falls under one security agreement or the other-an
issue that may require dating the collateral, a process that may prove
impossible if the debtor has collateral at various states of manufacture
with some components subject to one security agreement and some
components subject to another. Inventory lenders have come to rely
on the notice feature of section 9-312(3)."'1
Failure to give notice in this hypothetical, however, does not frustrate either of these purposes. Since Deering retains possession of the
fabric, the bank will not face either problem. It is possible that the
bank may rely not on physical inspection of Mill's inventory but on
should disclose, however, that the
financial reports; these reports
95
debtor is not in possession.'
These conclusions find further support in the proceeds rules of the
purchase money priority provisions. In fashioning the 1972 Amendments to Article 9, the drafters resolved the dispute over proceeds in
favor of the working capital lender as to inventory, and in favor of the
purchase money lender as to equipment. 196 Section 9-312(3) grants a
thin sliver of priority in proceeds to the purchase money seller of inventory. 197 Section 9-312(4) provides a broad priority in proceeds, however, for the purchase money seller of equipment. The drafters justify
this disparate treatment with the theory that inventory nearly always
generates proceeds, including accounts that are sometimes the subject
of financing arrangements, while equipment rarely does so.198 Clearly
the fabric in this hypothetical problem fits the inventory mold, and that
characterization will better serve the drafters' assumptions.

194. U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3 (fourth paragraph).
195. Lenders should request such information in advance of the audit. It appears that the
accounting profession still determines interests in inventory under a title approach. See 4
AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH), § 9005.10; R. KENNEDY & S. MCMULLEN, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 73 (6th ed. 1973); R. WIsoN, W. KELL, & N. BEDFORD, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 12, at 30 (5th ed. 1970).
196. See REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 113-14 (1971);
R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 136-38 (1973).

197. The priority extends only to identifiable cash proceeds received before the "debtor" delivers the inventory to the "buyer." U.C.C. § 9-306(1). In traditional sales, few cash proceeds,
other than a buyer's down payment, will arise before such delivery. The less traditional prepaying buyer, however, may generate substantial proceeds before the debtor delivers the goods to
him. To the extent that the purchase money party can identify those proceeds, he has broadened
the priority.
198. REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE U11FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note
196, at 114.

1184

Concept of Possession in Marketing
In short, to the extent that Tanbro posits an early time in the
course of the sales contract for granting a buyer rights in the goods, it
does not upset the plan of the purchase money priority rule. Even
though a purchase money seller "holds" the goods in order to perfect
its security interest, courts should consider the goods inventory; and
that holding should not require the purchase money seller to notify the
working capital lender in order to protect the seller's priority position.
V. The Thief Rule
It would surprise lawyers to encounter a rule of law without exceptions. The rule this Article proposes-that possession and nonpossession govern respectively the application and reach of good faith
purchase doctrine-admits of exceptions. They reveal a simple and
sensible approach: courts and legislatures set possession rules aside
when, but only when, the policy the rules serve conflicts with a paramount policy.
We have already discussed the special property interest rule of section 2-501 and the modest and short-term deviation it makes from a
strict rule honoring creditor reliance on debtor possession of inventory. 99 A more significant and far reaching exception is the "thief
rule."2'
Security of property principles do not permit a thief to pass good
title. Yet a thief in possession can mislead innocent purchasers, even
purchasers who qualify as good faith purchasers for value. Courts and
legislatures have generally insisted, without regard for the good faith
purchase doctrine, that a thief cannot convey what he does not have.20 '
There are a number of instances, however, in which the thief rule
itself admits of exception. For example, a person taking certain highly
negotiable types of property from a person who stole the property
defeats the true owner's title. Negotiable instruments,' 2 documents of
title, 20 3 securities 2° 4 (in bearer form) and money205 fall into the class of
199. See text accompanying notes 23-63 supra.
200. The designation of exceptions depends on the starting point adopted. If, as one might
suspect, possession is the oldest of property rules, any rule that departs from the possession rule is
an exception. If, on the other hand, title is the first rule of property, as the common-law courts
suggested, the possession rules discussed in this Article are exceptions, and the thief rule is not an
exception but an example of the general precept. This Article's characterization of the thief rule
as an exception assumes that the possession rule is older. Accord, 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 179 (1895); Maitland, supra note

24, at 488.
201. E.g., Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. 471, 479 (N.Y. 1806).

202. See U.C.C. §§ 3-202(1), -305(1).
203. See id.

§§

7-501, -502.

204. See id. §§ 8-301(2), -302.
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property to which a thief can give good title. There is authority for a
similar result with respect to items requiring indorsement, if the true
20 6
owner's negligence contributes to the thief's forgery.
Negligence by the owners of goods does not give rise to such broad
preclusion rules, however. The law of goods interposes the more limited doctrines of estoppel and agency-the rules of entrustment and
voidable title defeat the negligent owner of goods.2 "7 Although the
common law sometimes permitted a fraud to convey good title,20 8 it did
not always require that result if the malefactor's conduct amounted to
larceny.2 0 9 While it overlooks some of the distinctions between fraud
and "larceny by trick,"2 ' the Code adheres to the general notion that a
thief cannot convey good title.2 1
As this Article has indicated, the cases ground these distinctions in
the proposition that a thief cannot convey what he does not have. Yet
that proposition is true of all good faith purchase situations, and it cannot justify the distinctions. Rather, courts conclude that to permit a
thief to convey good title would make it easier for thieves to dispose of
goods and thereby promote theft-hence, the thief exception. The
thief rule thus departs from possession doctrine to serve what courts
view to be a paramount policy.
VI.

The Doubtful Case for the New York Rule

The issue before the courts in Tanbro was whether, given the role
possession plays in commercial law and the expectations that arise
from possession in practice, a new exception to security of property
principles is justified. The courts, however, believed they had only to
apply an isolated bit of straightforward statutory language-a belief
that is not often safe in construing a code-and accordingly built their
holdings on shallow foundations. We shall now consider those foundations and others suggested by commentators.
A.

Buyers in Ordinary Course
The New York court held that a buyer who does not take delivery

205. See, e.g., Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (K.B. 1758).
206. See U.C.C. §§ 3-405, -406, 4-406, 8-311.
207. See text accompanying notes 119-137 supra; f Porter v. Wertz, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 614
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (using estoppel against true owner who entrusted the goods to a thief).
208. See, e.g., White v. Garden, 138 Eng. Rep. 364, 367 (C.P. 1851).
209. See, eg., Parker v. Patrick, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1973) (dictum).
210. See U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 2 (second paragraph).
211. Id. § 7-503, Comment I advises: "A thief of the goods cannot indeed by shipping or
storing them to his own order acquire power to transfer them to a good faith purchaser."
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may nonetheless be a buyer in ordinary course.2 1 2 Chrysler213 and one
other decision z24 suggest a contrary view. Those cases, however, overlook the Code plan for determining a buyer's fights. The Code accords fights in the goods to the buyer at the time the goods are
identified to the contract.2 15 The moment of identification is also the
time at which the rights in the goods of a buyer in ordinary course
arise. That it may be in ordinary course for a buyer to buy without
taking delivery though the seller is not in possession is a novel idea, but
not one forbidden by the Code. The language "in ordinary course"
indicates legislative deference to commercial practice and is consistent
with the Code policy of accommodating the "continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties. 2 16
Practices of commerce determine what ordinary course is. The
New York courts made a factual finding that it was ordinary, though
infrequent, for textile converters like Mill to resell fabric to other converters while the fabric remained with the manufacturer, the only party
-with sufficient warehouse space to store it. Commercial practice will
determine the reach of the New York rule. To the extent that it is out
of the ordinary for buyers to buy goods that are not in the seller's possession and of which the buyer does not take delivery, the Tanbro holding does not apply.2 17 The holding that Tanbro was a buyer in
ordinary course should not be viewed as conflicting with Code language or policy.
B. Possession and Section 9-307()
The language of section 9-307(1), moreover, supports the position
that the seller need not be in possession of the goods for the buyer in
ordinary course to defeat the seller's secured creditor. Buyers in ordi212. This Article does not consider whether Tanbro acted in good faith, so as to satisfy the
"buyer in ordinary course" definition. See id. § 1-201(9).
213. See text accompanying notes 28-62 supra Chrysler held that a party does not become a
buyer until title passes. The court would not require delivery unless necessary to pass title.
214. Cf Farnum v. C.J. Merrill, Inc., 264 A.2d 150, 152 (Me. 1970) (a § 9-306(2) case).
215. See text accompanying notes 14-62 supra.
216. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
217. Nothing in § 2-501 suggests that goods cannot be identified unless they are in the seller's

possession. That construction would hamper the practice of drop shipping common to marketing
arrangements in many industries. Fairness to buyers requires a rule permitting the earliest time
for identification, and the rules of§ 2-501 effect that result. See id. § 2-501, Comments 2-6. Of
course a rule that goods not in the seller's possession cannot be identified would destroy Tanbro's
argument. Under this rule Tanbro would have no rights in the fabric, which was never in the
seller's possession. The rule, however, finds no justification in the letter or policy of§ 2-501. See
Morey Mach. Co. v. Great W. Indus. Mach. Co., 507 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1975).
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nary course find most of their special privileges in three Code sections.
The Article 2 entrustment provision expressly requires the seller to be
inpossession of the goods.2 18 An Article 7 provision applies only if the
goods are "sold and delivered"219 by the warehouse. By including
neither an entrustment nor a delivery requirement in section 9-307(1),
Code drafters obviously intended that neither be a prerequisite for operation of the provision. 220 Finally, the statute on which the buyer in
ordinary course rule of section 9-307(1) is patterned 2 2 ' contained a delivery requirement. As this Article. noted earlier, the omission of that
requirement would appear to be intentional.2 2 2 These distinctions,
moreover, did not escape the notice of the New York Law Revision
Commission when it studied the Code prior to adoption by the New
York legislature.22 3 The Commission's conclusion that section 9307(1) entails no delivery requirement stands as persuasive legislative
history.
Other Article 9 sections, by specifically requiring delivery, highlight the absence of the delivery requirement in section 9-307(1). Protection of bulk buyers against unperfected security interests applies
only if the buyers take delivery.2 24 Protection of purchasers of chattel
paper, instruments, and documents of title against prior secured parties
also depends upon possession by the purchaser.2 2 5 Only sections 9306(2) and 9-307(1) provide protection to buyers who do not take delivery.
The conclusion, however, that Code drafters intentionally omitted
the possession and delivery requirements in inventory sales does not
support the Tanbro result. It does support, and makes sense in terms
of, the view that a buyer's rights accrue at the moment of identification.
Sections 9-306(2) and 9-307(1) complement each other. Essentially,
they are inventory rules that favor buyers of inventory over sellers' secured lenders. In most cases, the secured party will authorize sales oit
218. Section 2-403(2) applies only if the true owner entrusts the goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind. "Entrusting" includes delivery to the merchant or acquiescence in his
retention of possession. Id. § 2-403(3).
219. Id. § 7-205 (emphasis added). The rule of Article 7, moreover, applies only to fungibles.
Id.
220. The predecessor provisions of § 9-307(1) assumed that the seller was in possession. See
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 9; UNIFORM TRUST RECETS ACT §§ 1 & 9-2(a).
221. UNIFORM TRUST RFCEiTs ACT § 1.
222. Id See also note 40 supra & accompanying text.
223. The Commission's report not only notes the omission but comments on it extensively and
with some disapproval. See 1 REPORT OF THE [N.Y.] LAW REV'N COMM'N FOR 1955, STUDY OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 239-42.

224. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c).
225. See id. §§ 9-308, -309. Cf.id. §§ 1-201(20), 3-302, 7-501, 8-301 (indicating that possession is a prerequisite for the application of § 9-309).
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of inventory. Under section 9-306(2) that authorization operates to
give the buyer the goods free of the security interest.22 6 In the unlikely, but possible, event that the secured party does not authorize
sales, section 9-307(1) fulfills the reasonable expectation of buyers out
of inventory by providing that buyers in ordinary course take free of
the security
interest no matter what the secured lender says about
7
sales.

22

By eliminating the delivery requirement from sections 9-306(2)
and 9-307(1), however, the Code drafters apparently permit sale free of
a security interest when the secured party, not the seller, is in possession-the Tanbro result. Yet "the proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its
reason." 228 The ostensible purpose of not requiring delivery in sections 9-306(2) and 9-307(1) is to prevent the secured party from defeating a buyer when goods free of a possessory security interest have been
identified. The view adopted by the New York court, that the secured
party loses even when he is inpossession, carries the nondelivery feature
of section 9-307(1) further than its purpose requires, and is inconsistent

with the commercial law tradition of according significance to possession. 2 9
226. In Tanbro, the court of appeals makes passing reference to the fact that Deering enjoyed
a security interest in any proceeds arising upon the sale of the fabric by Mill and suggests that this
fact provides an alternative basis for the court's ruling. That reasoning stems from Comment 3 to
§ 9-306 (1962 version) which says that by taking a security interest in proceeds the secured party
may have impliedly authorized the sale. If authorized, of course, the sale is free of the security
interest. Id. § 9-306(2). The notion that taking a security interest in proceeds impliedly authorizes the sale has a colorful history. When the New York legislature first considered the Code, a
rule to that effect was part of§ 9-307(3). See U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1950 version). The 1957 version
of§ 9-306(2) deleted any reference to the idea. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1957 version). The comments, however, retained it. Id., Comment 3. In the 1972 amendments adopted in New York
after Tanbro, the Permanent Editorial Board excised the language from the comments and added
that such right to proceeds "does not in itself constitute an authorization of sale." Id. § 9-306,
Comment 3 (second paragraph). It would be a misreading of the New York court's opinion to say
that the case turns on this alternative theory. A fair reading of the opinion clearly indicates that
the court decided the case on the basis of§ 9-307(l), not § 9-306(2). Thus the 1972 amendments
now adopted in New York do not, by altering the comment to § 9-306(2), affect the New York
rule.
227. The absence of the delivery requirement from §§ 9-306 and 9-307 is consistent with the
view that the rights of the buyer arise upon identification. Thus a secured party cannot claim that
he defeats a buyer of identified goods when the buyer has not taken delivery. The drafters saw
delivery as essential only in situations that do not involve goods, when the concept of identification has no application, and in the rule of § 9-301(l)(c) which protects buyers not in ordinary
course. It is beyond the scope of the text to discuss whether these sensible rules should apply to
those who buy farm goods from farmers. See general, Dolan, Section 9-307(1): The UCC's Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the Open Market, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.706 (1977).
228. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment I.
229. The New York rule, moreover, does not take into account the significance of the time
involved in the Tanbro case, where Deering held the fabric for some eight months. 48 App. Div.
2d at 786, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49 (1975) (dissenting opinion), aff'd,39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d
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CommercialFairness

Tanbro ostensibly rests in part on solicitude for buyers' interests.
Those who defend it assume that section 9-307(1) is a buyer protection
rule and that the rule's expansion is good because it theoretically relieves an imbalance between biryers and lenders. 230 As a pro-buyer
measure, however, the New York rule is patently wasteful. Under it,
secured parties may no longer rely with confidence on pledges, field
warehousing arrangements or the option of repossession, for a trier of
fact23 1 may conclude that it is "ordinary" for buyers in the industry to
buy even when a seller does not have possession. Lenders in New
York may now be compelled to compute the cost of that uncertainty
into the price of their credit; their borrowers will pay that cost and pass

it on to customers.
Comparison of the New York rule's cost to creditors with its bene-

fits to buyers tells against the rule. Although buyers gain protection
against the seller's creditors with Article 9 security interests, they remain vulnerable to creditors with Article 2 security interests, artisans
with liens, qualified holders, and sellers in possession. If a buyer pays
for goods before delivery, he does so at the risk that the seller may fail
to deliver or that a third party other than the seller's creditor may have

superior rights. Cautious buyers will continue the tradition of paying
after delivery or against documents. 2 In short, the rule does not benefit buyers greatly.
The detriment to creditors, however, is significant. No creditor
can know whether the goods he holds have been sold or remain secur-

ity for his loan. A secret sale will be possible, in conflict with the spirit
590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976). If there is some way to extend the special property rule to the
Tanbro situation, it should not be extended without the commercially reasonable time limitation
of§ 2-402(2). See text accompanying notes 41, 55, & 56 supra.
230. See Birnbaum, supra note 9; Burke, Secured Transactions Uniform Commercial Code 4nnual Survey, 32 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1150 (1977).
231. It would seem that the question of ordinary course is a factual issue. In Tanbro, however, the trial court directed a verdict on the liability issue and both appellate courts affirmed that
holding. Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 48 App. Div. 2d 784, 785, 369 N.Y.S.2d
146, 147 (1975), af/'d, 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976). This result is
particularly surprising in light of the fact that the trial record apparently reflected conflicting
testimony on the ordinary course issue. Id. at 787, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (1975) (dissenting opinion). See also Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d
317, 321 (1970), which also treats the ordinary course question as a matter of law. Professor
Skilton views the question as one of fact. Skilton, supra note 102, at 31-32.
232. To some degree Tanbro aids the prepaying buyer. Yet that benefit is too small to offset
the cost of the New York rule. This Article's view of the identification rule favors prepaying
buyers and without the difficulties of the New York rule. If a prepaying buyer may become a
buyer in ordinary course at the moment of identification, many prepaying buyers will defeat the
seller's creditor if the creditor is not in possession.
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of section 2-402(2), which forbids secret sales in another context.z33 As
this Article noted earlier,2 34 this section recognizes a line of pre-Code
cases that treated as fraudulent the practice of leaving a seller in possession of goods after their sale: the section's purpose is to prevent seller
and buyer from misleading seller's creditor who may reasonably rely
on seller's merchandise as collateral.2 3 5
A creditor relying on a pledge, field warehouse, or the option of
repossession can do almost nothing to prevent application of the New

York rule. He must either bear the economic loss or pass it on to his
debtors in the form of a higher cost of credit. The repossessing credi-

tor may conceivably protect himself by selling the collateral promptly,
before the debtor can find a buyer in ordinary course. But the pressure

to sell quickly may result in reduced sales prices, which wil not benefit
creditors or debtors.
The cost of a contrary rule would be small. If possession remained a signal of ownership, except when possession was in a thief,
buyers could usually rely on that signal. Nonpossession would warn
against purchase: the careful buyer, unlike Tanbro, would not pay for
goods he could not see. Thus, the possession rule would reward the
buyer who did not pay for goods until they were delivered, or at least
until the seller had possession. It is easy and inexpensive for buyers to
comply with the possession rule;2 6 buyers need only observe practices
they should observe to protect themselves in any event.
The defenders of the New York rule substitute pro-buyer senti-

233. This section permits a creditor of the seller to treat a sale as void if the buyer leaves the
seller in possession in a manner that local law considers a fraud against the creditor. See Warner
v. Norton, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 448, 460 (1857); Hamilton v. Russell, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 309, 318
(1803).
234. See text accompanying notes 160-62 supra.
235. The letter of § 2-402(2) does not, however, reach the conduct of Mill and Tanbro. Tanbro did not leave Mill in possession--the conduct that triggers application of the section. Tanbro
did leave Deering in possession, and conduct of this sort, protected by the New York rule, misleads to a greater degree than the conduct deemed fraudulent by the pre-Code line of cases to
which § 2-402(2) defers.
Buyers who enter into a contract, as Mill did, to buy goods in the possession of a third party
bailee, may insist on attornment by the bailee before paying for the goods. That procedure is
inexpensive and relatively quick. The buyer issues a delivery order and asks the bailee to "accept" it. The arrangement is not common to American commercial experience, but neither is the
practice ofpaying for goods that are not in the seller's possession or are not represented by documents. In any event, a rule requiring attornment will yield less waste than the Tanbro rule. For
an instance of the practice suggested here, see Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 552 P.2d
317 (Colo. App. 1976). See generaly Murray, The Delivery Order in American and English Commercial Law, 82 COM. L.J. 205 (1977).
236. Buyers distant from the seller's premises may insist on a bill of lading before they pay for
goods-an inexpensive and well-established procedure. See text accompanying notes 103-05
supra.
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ment and the culpability standard for efficiency and common sense. 2 3 7
Their approaches do not provide realistic guidance in creditor-buyer
disputes.23 8 They ignore the most compelling argument for treating
possessory and nonpossessory interests differently in the law: parties
deal with them differently in fact. Commercial fairness therefore fails
to justify the New York rule.
1. Title
During the drafting of the Code, commercial lawyers struggled
over the role title should play in commercial law. Respected authority
23 9

cautioned against scuttling a concept so central to the law of sales.

Other counsel2 4° prevailed, however, and the sales article reduced title
to the narrowest role. The preamble to section 2-401 makes it clear
that title does not govern the rights of the buyer under Article 2 and
24 1
that the role of title largely relates to noncommercial questions:
"[The rights and remedies of the parties to the contract of sale, as defined in [Article 2] . . .rest on the contract and its performance or
breach and not on stereotyped presumptions as to the location of title."'2 42 From time to time the interests of buyers and secured parties
intersect. Section 9-307(1) is one such instance, and it would be a distinct disservice to the cause of uniformity and to the entire Code effort
if courts were to give buyers rights under Article 9 that Article 2 does
not accord them. Tanbro and other recent cases have committed that
237. For criticism of the culpability standard, see text accompanying note, 119-27 supra.
238. For similar criticism of the pro-lender rule excepting farm sales from § 9-307(1), see Dolan, supra note 227.
239. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the ProposedUniform CommercialCode, 63 HARV. L.
REv. 561, 566-72 (1950).
240. See generally Llewellyn, Through Title to Contractand a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L. REv.
159 (1938).
241. U.C.C. § 2-401 provides in pertinent part: "Each provision of this Article with regard to
the rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title."
242. Id. § 2-505, Comment 1. Some authorities see the comment as overbroad. See, e.g., the
evaluation by Professor Honnold in I REPORT OF THE [N.Y.] LAW REV'N COMM'N, supra note
223, at 445. See also W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 90-91 (1958); R. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 375-76 (1970). It is clear, however, that these authorities
relegate title to the very narrowest role. Professor Honnold says that "remitting problems to a
'title' concept is inconsistent with the aims of the Code to provide specific rules for different sales
problems." N. Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N REPORT, supranote 223, at 451. It is clear, moreover, that
Professor Llewellyn, chief draftsman of Article 2, saw the role of title confined not to seller-buyer
disputes but to questions such as taxation and larceny: "The fact is that to make the respective
rights of seller and buyer turn on where title passes according to an intention which buyer and
seller do not have, has made trouble which a century and a half of case law has not cleared up.
Meanwhile such questions as those of taxation and the like are handled with new clarity and
certainty by See. 2-401 ff." I-REPORT OF THE [N. Y.] LAW REV'N COMM'N FOR 1954, supra note
171, at 123 (emphasis in original).
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error. 243

VII.

Conclusion

From folklore to commercial law the concept of possession has
proved an efficient guide for determining rights to goods. In the long
struggle between secured lenders and buyers, possession has been the

touchstone for the doctrine of good faith purchase in its various manifestations. When possession induces reliance on the part of buyers, the
entrustment and voidable title rules defer to that reliance. When possession may mislead the creditor, the fraudulent retention rule defers to
the creditor. In general, possession rules serve reasonable expectations
and efficiency. Both the common law and the Code disappoint the
reasonable expectations possession fosters when that possession results

from theft. In that situation the law defers to security of property principles and rejects the claims of good faith purchasers. In addition, the

effect of identification rules may disappoint, though briefly, some cred243. 7'anbro reflects a mode of thought rooted in outdated title rules. The court of appeals
opinion notes and never rejects plaintiff's argument that "if it had title by purchase its goods were
excluded from the security arrangement which was literally restricted to the 'property of the
buyer', that is, Mill Fabrics." 39 N.Y.2d at 636, 350 N.E.2d at 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 261-62. In
fact, the court compounds the error of Tanbro's attorneys by posing the issue in terms of title. "In
any event, unless prevented by other provisions of the code... Tanbro took title subject to Deering's security interest." .d. at 636, 350 N.E.2d at 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
Assuming that the parties had identified the subject matter of the sale, Tanbro did take title.
See U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b). But title should have had nothing to do with the court's inquiry. The
error of couching the facts in terms of title lies in the implicit assumption that if Tanbro had title,
Mill did not. From that intermediate premise the trial court leapt to the incorrect conclusion that
Deering could have no security interest in property that did not belong to its debtor. See Tanbro
Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 48 App. Div. 2d 784, 787, 369 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149 (1975)
(dissenting opinion), afd,36 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976). The idea
that Tanbro had title to the fabric argues for the conclusion that it was Tanbro's fabric for all
purposes. One commentator argues that ifa buyer obtains title he takes free of an original seller's
Article 2 security interest. Kreindler, supra note 9, at 87-88. The argument rests on common-law
notions of title. It is difficult to find anything in the Code that suggests the result. Kreindler
himself admits that "the Code does not expressly so state." Id. at 87. As this Article argues,
buyers should take subject to Article 2 possessory security interests as well as Article 9 security
interests, unless they benefit from good faith purchase rules. The Code's use of the term "security
interest" in Article 2 supports this view. See U.C.C. § 2-401; Kreindler, supra note 9, at 86-87 and
authority cited therein.
The New York courts consistently referred to the fact that Tanbro "purchased" the fabric and
that Mill "sold" it to Tanbro. See, e.g., 48 App. Div. 2d at-, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 147, 39 N.Y.2d at
634-35, 350 N.E.2d at 590-91, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61. Words such as "purchase," "buy," and
"sell" carry much pre-Code cargo, and most of it is title oriented. For precision, courts and
lawyers should not use these terms in evaluating the rights of buyers and sellers. Instead, they
must recognize that buyers' and sellers' rights emanate from contracts of sale and Article 2, not
from metaphysical presumptions conjured up by freighted language. The contract in Tanbro
gave the buyer a special property interest in the goods. Whether that property interest deserved
to prevail requires analysis of the reason and purpose of § 9-307(1). To approach the analysis
with title and its pre-Code connotations in mind prejudices the inquiry.
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itors who rely on their-debtor's possession. These exceptions, however,
serve a paramount policy.
Ignoring the general scheme and the rules of Article 2 that reflect
it, a New York court has found in section 9-307(1) a broad exception to
the scope of possession's role. The thief exception defers to the policy
against theft and against making the rewards for theft easy. The
Code's novel identification rule fosters commercial celerity and operates within short time constraints. The New York rule, however,
serves no policy and operates without commercially reasonable restraints. Relying on the strict language of section 9-307(1) and the
emotive concepts of title and buyer protection, the Tanbro court has
abandoned the efficiency analysis on which the possession rules are
bottomed. The result is a commercial anomaly, a rule that serves no
purpose and casts a pall of uncertainty over the commercially useful
devices of pledge, field warehouse, and repossession.
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